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 ABSTRACT
 
Paradigms offer different perspectives of reality
 
and therefore manipulate facts to accentuate some issues
 
and take away from others. Until recently, the dominate
 
Realist paradigm held sway by explaining international
 
relations in terms of garnering and distributing power.
 
The paradigm contends domestic polity and ethics are
 
I ■ ■ , 
separate and distinct from global conditions. This notion
 
reinforced and rationalized colonial struggles and
 
imperialist methods of control. Transnationalism is
 
currently challenging Rationalism's dominance by offering
 
a world that is more complex than just the drive for
 
national security. According to Transnationalism
 
nation-state politics are influenced by non-state actors,
 
individuals and increased state integration.
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CHAPTER ONE
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The Role of Paradigms
 
According to Thomas Kuhn a paradigm relates to
 
"research firmly based upon one or more past scientific
 
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific
 
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the
 
foundation for its practice". Paradigms then are the set
 
of beliefs, concepts, theories, methods and instruments
 
that help guide scientific communities to truth testing
 
data, selection of hypotheses and advocating one theory
 
over another. In short a paradigm is an intellectual
 
framework that structures one's thinking about a set of
 
phenomena.^
 
Kuhn argues that paradigms are impacted by four phases.
 
The first, is the preparadigmic phase in which there is
 
no dominate or overwhelming approach that is agreed on
 
by the scientific community. The second is the paradigmic
 
phase which occurs when the body of community subscribes
 
to a dominate paradigm. The third phase, and one which
 
concerns this study, is the "crisis phase". During this
 
phase challenges and revision to the dominate paradigm
 
transpire and new paradigms appear and old ones are revived,
 
The fourth and final phase is the phase of scientific
 
revolution which takes place when the community exchanges
 
one paradigm for another. This study attempts to confirm
 
Kuhn's view that paradigms are transitory and that the
 
third phase is presently occurring among practitioners
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of political science.
 
Paradigms offer different perspectives of reality
 
and therefore manipulate facts to accentuate some issues
 
and take away from others. There have been four major
 
paradigms that have shaped the discipline of international
 
relations in the 20th century: the Idealist paradigm, the
 
Marxist paradigm, the Realist paradigm, and the
 
Transnationalist paradigm. These paradigms are of
 
significant importance to the study of international affairs
 
because governments have operationalized them to construct
 
policy. While this study focuses on Realism and
 
Transnationalism, Idealism and Marxism are worthy of note
 
and will be discussed below for the purpose of lending
 
theoretical continuity to this study.
 
The Idealist Paradigm
 
According to Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Idealism
 
is also referred to as "Liberalism" in international
 
relations and, as a paradigm, stresses international law
 
5

and moral values. Thus, Idealism concerns itself with
 
how the world ought to be as opposed to how it has been
 
and contends that a "harmony of interests" should guide
 
issues of foreign policy rather than national interest,
 
power and state survival.
 
Practitioners of Idealism were attacked by E.H. Carr
 
in his pivotal work The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939:
 
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,
 
for their propensity to ignore what was and indulge in
 
wishful thinking.^ As a result of the Idealist focus on
 
the abstract they were unable to comprehend nor control
 
events during the paradigm's zenith between World War I
 
and World War II. According to Carr, Idealists such as
 
Woodrow Wilson, Arnold Toynbee, Norman Angell and Alfred
 
Zimmern, failed to recognize that nation state behavior
 
was directly related to national interest and power as
 
opposed to universal mores. Thus foreign policies based
 
on good will and disarmament were naturally doomed to
 
failure because "these supposedly absolute and universal
 
principles were not principles at all but the unconscious
 
reflections of national policy based on a particular
 
interpretation of national interest at a particular time."
 
While Carr was correct in identifying the Idealist approach
 
as taking place between the early 1900*s and 1940*s, this
 
school of thought was rooted in earlier philosophies.
 
Indeed, John Lock, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant
 
and John Stuart Mill are considered to be Idealists since
 
they all asserted that conscience and reason are both
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paramount in achieving world peace and harmony. In an
 
example of Kuhn's crisis phase. Idealism was superseded
 
by the Realist paradigm during the 1950's because the former
 
was discredited in part by the inability of the League
 
of Nations to prevent World War II.
 
The Marxist Paradigm
 
It is very difficult to illuminate a Marxist theory
 
of international relations since Karl Marx died prior to
 
constructing an explicit theory on international relations.
 
A John Atkinson Hobson contributed to the construction
 
in Marxist theory in his notable work on imperialism in
 
1902. Hobson argued that British imperialism was the result
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of surplus capital and diminishing returns at home.
 
Therefore, rather than increase local wages industrialists
 
expanded their markets--often forcefully— into foreign
 
lands. Thus British imperialism "was directly linked to
 
overseas investments".^® Rudolf Hilferding continued the
 
Marxian tradition by incorporating Hobson*s work into Marx's
 
theory of historical materialism.11 Lenin added to these
 
works in his now famous imperialism, the Highest Stage
 
of Capitalism in 1916.
 
Lenin held that imperialism was the final dying stage
 
of capitalism which contained five essential features:
 
(1) the concentration of production by the few which intern
 
created monopolies; (2) an oligarchy was formed by the
 
fusion of banking and industrial capital; (3) capital is
 
exported from impoverished nation states; (4) the world
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has been shared by international capitalists; and (5) the
 
earth is divided by the greatest capitalist powers.
 
Although there is no specific Communist approach to
 
international relations we can, by combining Lenin's works
 
along with those found in Marx's Das Kapital, safely outline
 
the Marxist paradigm as follows:
 
1. All history is the history of class struggle
 
between a ruling group and an opposing group.
 
2. Capitalism gives rise to antagonistic classes,
 
the bourgeoisie and proletariat, with bourgeoisie
 
control.
 
3. Capitalism uses war to further its own ends.
 
4. Socialism, which destroys classes, must also
 
destroy war.
 
5. Once the state has withered away, so too must
 
international relations.
 
In sum, the Marxist paradigm argues that economies dictated
 
the establishment and maintenance of the state. Once the
 
accumulation of private capital, which was held in the
 
hands of a few, was transferred, and held collectively
 
by the many via a world wide revolution, there would be
 
global harmony and the state would disappear. This paradigm
 
as practiced by the Soviets and East Europeans has failed.
 
One could argue that Marxism never truly existed in those
 
otherwise"Communist" states therefore the paradigm has
 
not been sufficiently tested.
 
Setting the Analytical Framework
 
Consistent with Kuhn's paradigmatic phase, and as
 
a result of certain analytical weaknesses and practical
 
failings of both the Marxist and Idealist paradigms, the
 
Realist and Transnationlist perspectives took on a more
 
elevated status. However, I believe that contemporary
 
Realism is an extension of, if not a refinement of
 
colonialist policies. Therefore chapter two concentrates
 
on the legacy of colonialism and its impact on international
 
relations as expressed in Realism. The purpose of this
 
chapter, then, is to demonstrate that the world which was
 
born of Machiavellian principles and expressed later in
 
Realist theory is slowly changing. Indeed, there are
 
alternatives to the often inflexible doctrines associated
 
with Realism. Realists are often eager to point out that
 
the present state of international confusion or
 
confrontation is justification of their theory. However,
 
I contend that this is a reaction to Realism likened to
 
the rattling of the egg prior to the Phoenix. This chapter
 
is dedicated to an elaboration of the specific weakness
 
of the Realist paradigm. In summary, it can argued with
 
some confidence that the disciplirie of international
 
relations has generally, and Western foreign policy
 
specifically, has been influenced by certain Machiavellian
 
principles of power which have formed the philosophical
 
bases of the Realist paradigm. The relative "correctness"
 
or weakness of International Relation's theories and
 
practices must, then, be addressed through an objective
 
analysis of the Realist paradigm.
 
The Realist model, which came to dominate international
 
relations theory in the West, is the subject of the third
 
chapter of this study. In an effort to illuminate the
 
positions and elements pertaining to the Realist paradigm
 
the chapter draws on the major works of Realists Hans
 
Morgenthau, Hedly Bull, Klaus Knorr, Kenneth Waltz, Edward
 
L. Morse and Rienhold Neibuhr. Basically, Realism can
 
be summarized as the struggle for power. Realists argue
 
that states seek security in an otherwise hostile and
 
anarchical world. Thus a state's international policy is
 
determined and reinforced by the drive for power in order
 
to guarantee the survivability of the state. The dominate
 
states tend to be more conservative and support policies
 
that maintain the status quo, while subordinate states
 
expressing their dissatisfaction, become more
 
expansionistic. The result is that alliances are made and
 
broken and friends become enemies in the quest for national
 
security. Accordingly, universal principles of morality
 
do not apply within the sphere of international relations.
 
Realists contend like Machiavelli writing in the sixteenth
 
century and Thomas Hobbs writing a century later, that
 
is necessary for leaders to have a different set of morals
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for governing in an anarchical world.
 
In contrast to the long established Realist view,
 
the, forth chapter of this work turns to the Transnationalist
 
paradigm* Drawing on Kuhn's notion of scientific
 
revolution--and because Transnationalism will be considered
 
as a challenge to the predominate paradigm—there are some
 
general rules of analysis that must be followed if a rival
 
paradigm is to gain aeceptance in the academic community.
 
According to Imre Lakatos the contending paradigm must:
 
"(1) explain everything the old theory explained, (2)
 
explain at least part of what the old theory failed to
 
explain, and (3) have some explanations under and
 
empirically corroborated by research. Because In the
 
spirit of offering an alternative, Transnationalism is
 
more complex and posits more elements than Realism, this
 
chapter will provide additional information and in greater
 
depth than the chapter on Realism.
 
Transnationalism contends that the world of
 
international politics is more complex than states being
 
driven by the need for national security. Theorists such
 
as James Rosenau, Richard Falk, Joseph Nye and Robert
 
Keohane posit that other non-state actors, aside from the
 
military, diplomats, and official policy makers also
 
influence the international polity. Transnationalists argue
 
that international relations are becoming increasingly
 
more integrated.16 They claim that separate national
 
entities which have political and economic power are merging
 
into supranational authorities such as the European
 
Community. Although this process is slow, multi-layered,
 
and tends to grow in spurts, many scholars contend that
 
the merging of economies is usually the first step toward
 
greater interdependence.17 Accordingly, Transnational
 
integration occurs undei: the influence of many different
 
variables which hasten or impede the process. For example,
 
integration of militaries is made easier under the threat
 
of war, such as in the establishment of NATO, while
 
recessions reduce the likelihood of merging economies.
 
James Rosenau identifies these variables as "environments"
 
which he classifies as contiguous, regional, cold war,
 
racial, resource, and organizational. Thus, in around about
 
way, chapter two seeks to build upon Rosenau's thesis by
 
contributing an additional environment the colonial legacy.
 
The bhsic premise of this paper focuses on the idea
 
that increased integration and cohesion, as illustrated
 
by the Transnationalist paradigm, is leading the world
 
to a brighter future while at the same time the persistent
 
behavior related to the memory and/or extension of colonial
 
policies often thwart efforts of integration. By studying
 
Colonialism, Realism, and Transnationalism the arena of
 
world politics can be seen with greater comprehension and
 
the actual transition from one paradigm to another might
 
be eased.
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We now turn our attention to a discussion of
 
Colonialism and its relevance to the study of Realism and
 
Transnationalism.
 
11
 
CHAPTER TWO
 
THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 
1 2
 
The colonial legacy has a greater role to play in
 
contemporary political affairs and subsequent theory
 
building than is currently addressed in Western literature.
 
That is, the colonial experience has left a lingering impact
 
on the politics, economics and psychological make up of
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the Third World countries. As Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner
 
suggests, these effects have lingered because of the length
 
and intensity of the colonial experience. Thus, the
 
rearrangement of Third World power, the redefinition of
 
national borders, and associated conflicts will continue
 
for some time and may not end until they finally arrive
 
at a point of indigenous geographic and Social equilibrium
 
rather than one imposed upon the land and people by colonial
 
design.
 
Indeed, most interstate confrontation that has occurred
 
in the last forty years has been between underdeveloped
 
countries (UDCVs).While there are, quantitatively, more
 
UDC's than developed countries, Braveboy asserts that
 
"these countries exhibit a proportionally higher level
 
of both verbal and physical conflict behavior." Therefore,
 
one might conclude that there must be some shared factors
 
between the states which can be directly attributed to
 
the high frequency of social unrest, revolutions and wars
 
among them.^ It has been suggested that conflict in the
 
underdeveloped wOrld can be sorted into patterns of national
 
development including: "confrontations as anti-colonial
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conflict, territorial disputes, irredentist conflicts and
 
class agitation involving subgroup nationalism" and second,
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the impact of modernization.
 
This section of the thesis draws on the Braveboy
 
hypothesis and will attempt to underscore its strengths
 
by outlining the broad historical trends and conditions
 
that have influenced UDC political growth. This will be
 
accomplished by: (1) defining colonialism; (2) illuminating
 
methods of suppression used by imperialists; (3) examining
 
the effects of colonialism on UDC's; (4) surveying the
 
UDC's responses to colonialism; (5) exploring origins of
 
racism and (6) concluding observations.
 
Colonialism and Imperialism: Questions of Definition
 
Bruce Wetteran defines colonialism as a "policy or
 
program by which a state seeks political or economic control
 
over other territories." Concomitantly Harry Ritter defines
 
imperialism as "the expansion of a state beyond its own
 
frontiers with the aim of dominating other states or
 
societies."^ Due to the similarity of domination by one
 
state over another within these definitions and others
 
examined, there appears to be no difference in practice,
 
between colonialism and imperialism. If there is difference
 
to be found it is not in the actual effects but rather
 
rooted in historical distortions or in the semantics of
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th© aggressive foirces. For example/ when Ameiricans consideir
 
the term 'Golonialist' it brings back moments of national
 
glory rooted in the early foundations of the Plymouth and
 
Jamestown colonies, and later the Revolutionary War; it
 
does not focus on the slaughter of the indigenous
 
inhabitants. Therefore, colonization in America carries
 
the romantic image of forging a new nation as opposed to
 
the contrasting view of domination which is held through
 
out the Third World. Concomitantly, William Appleman
 
Williams contends that Americans hold the principle of
 
self-determination in high esteem while imperialism has,
 
over time, become seen as a negative element by freedom
 
loving Americans.^ This distinction surprises many
 
individuals in the Third World who see the open door
 
policy—the notion that American moral and ideological
 
expansion would promote democracy and curtail world
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unrest—as a clear case of American imperialism. In
 
addition, the expansion of developed economies have made
 
it nearly impossible for other underdeveloped countries
 
to achieve economic independence, and its logical extension,
 
political independence. This sequence of events is seen
 
by many in the underdeveloped nations as yet another form
 
of imperialism and while denied by the developed nations,
 
this schism continues and further complicates any hope
 
of establishing definitional clarity between colonialism
 
and imperialism. However, if we were to make any distinction
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between the two terms we might argue for imperialism being
 
the tools used by the colonialists.
 
COLONIALISM
 
Colonialism has a long history, spanning over 400
 
years, encompassing nine percent of the earth's surface
 
by 1492, and expanding to include eighty-five percent of
 
the globe by 1935. During those 400 hundred years
 
colonialism passed through three periods.
 
The first expression of early colonialism was
 
mercantilism. With mercantilism European monarchies saw
 
their economies as a zero sum. That is, any flow of goods
 
or services outside the realm weakened the nation.
 
Therefore the European powers felt compelled to expand
 
their economies by licensing companies to gather raw
 
materials from foreign lands and returning them to the
 
homeland where factories turned them into finished products.
 
To safeguard their investment the Europeans built a series
 
of military complexes.
 
Neo-Mercantism was the second period of colonialism,
 
and lasted from the 1700's until 1890. During this period
 
Europeans increased their dominions. To pay for the
 
expansion, two methods of economic extraction were used:
 
(1) tribute, either direGtly through taxation or indirectly
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through a captive market for home based goods; and (2)
 
slavery.
 
The third period occurred from 1890 to the middle
 
of the 20th Century. There was a dramatic rise in the
 
conquest of unexplored territory based on anticipated
 
economic gain which subsequently effected the European
 
balance of power. Unique to this phase was a change in
 
the style of domination. Unlike the periods listed above,
 
entire governments were not taken over but became
 
protectorates. Protectorates were allowed to carry some
 
semblance of traditional control while subservient
 
authorities were actually irtanipulated for European
 
interests.^® This phase is often referred as economic
 
imperialism.11 "
 
Influenced by the work of Karl Marx, John Atkinson
 
Hobson, who wrote the notable work Imperialism in 1902,
 
contended that British imperialism was the result of surplus
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capital and diminishing returns at home. Therefore, rather
 
than increase local wages industrialists expanded their
 
markets— often forcefully— into foreign lands. Thus
 
British imperialism was "directly linked to overseas
 
investments."^^ While Karl Marx died prior to constructing
 
an explicit theory on the economic aspects of imperialism,
 
Rudolf Hilferding continued in the Marxian tradition by
 
incorporating Hobson's work into Marx's theory of historical
 
materialism. Lenin added to these works in his now famous
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Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916.
 
Lenin held that imperialism was the final dying stage
 
of capitalism and as such it contained five essential
 
features;
 
(1) The concentration of production and capital
 
developed so highly that it creates monopolies
 
which play a decisive role in economic life.
 
(2) The fusion of banking capital with industrial
 
capital and the creation, on the basis of this
 
financial capital of a financial oligarchy
 
(3) The export of capital, which has become
 
extremely important as distinguished from the
 
export of commodities.
 
(4) The formation of the international capitalist
 
monopolies which share out the world among
 
themselves.
 
(5) The territorial division of the whole eajjr^h
 
completed by the greatest capitalist powers.
 
According to Rene' Maunier (1949), imperialism takes
 
four forms: spiritual, power, material and cultural. By
 
using his framework we can examine the various tools of
 
colonialism.
 
First, Maunier argues that "spiritual imperialism
 
is domination of the religious nature. Spiritual or
 
religious imperialism is the first phase of all colonial
 
imperialism".^^ Religion has the unique ability to motivate
 
its proponents and champions by both fear and hope. In
 
the case of conquest, crusader minset, that of moral
 
obligation, is the rationalization behind religious
 
domination. That is, by not suppressing the anti-Christ
 
veiws of the heathen, the conqueror perpetuates evil and
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indirectly transfers the blame onto himself for neglecting
 
his duty. Thus justifing his agressive actions. Moreover,
 
religious fear protects the champion from accruing lists
 
of sin by allowing them to reduce their crimes through
 
the destruction of evil and thus receiving absolution.
 
The crusader motivation also perpetuates the myth
 
that the dominating religious believers are possessed by
 
a deity and are therefore superior to non-believers.
 
Needless to say, those members of the dominant "superior"
 
faith are hostile to all others outside their religion.
 
Because the "native" believes in a 'false god,' the result
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is either extermination or forced assimilation. While
 
extermination is at best inhumane, assimilation through
 
conversion subjects the converted to long term racial and
 
cultural contempt by those who see their role as one of
 
raising or uplifting the heathen.
 
Maunier claims that spiritual imperialism contains
 
"two constant features: duty and domination."17 Of these
 
factors, the duty to save men's souls is the fundamental
 
difference between spiritual imperialism and all other
 
types of imperialism. As a corollary of salvation, it can
 
be convincingly argued that, at one /time or another, most
 
of the world's religions have relied upon violence as their
 
chosen method to impose their teachings rather than cerebral
 
persuasion (See Figure 2.1).
 
Religious missions have been effectively used by
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Figure 2.1
 
Relationship of Colonialism to Imperialism
 
COLONIALISM
 
Imperialistic Tools
 
Economic Investments
 
Spiritual
 
COLONIALISM Power COLONIALISM
 
Material
 
Cultural
 
Divide and Rule
 
Indirect Divide and Rule
 
COLONIALISM
 
All colonial nations are imperialistic but degrees of
 
domination may vary. Likewlsef nations can use the tools
 
of Imperialism without being colonial.
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regimes to suppress indigenous peoples. This is because
 
missionaries are generally transplanted from the home
 
country and upon entering into a 'backward' society the
 
infusion of their religious principles destroys the social
 
matrix of the traditional culture. Because missionaries
 
received state support/ tacit or otherwise, when rebellion
 
seemed imminent they reciprocated by proclaiming the revolt
 
as an act against God, and effectively reduced the
 
indigenous peoples' psychological advantage of having God
 
on their side. On the other hand, religion can act as a
 
unifying force behind revolutions by helping revolutionaries
 
galvanize support behind a single issue. Accordingly,
 
"all through Asia and Africa the imperial governments were
 
identified as Christian and hostility to these governments
 
was transferred to their religion."^® According to Braveboy,
 
anti-Christian sentiment was easily introduced among
 
indigenous peoples because of the discrepancy between
 
Christian teachings and actual colonial behavior. Therefore
 
Christianity became nativized or, conversely, traditional
 
religions and cultures became strengthened. The focus on
 
traditional religions became a rallying point used by many
 
nationalistic leaders to foster group cohesion and build
 
up 'home' appeal. Having learned their lessons well, some
 
former colonies now find it to their advantage to portray
 
the enemies of the state as enemies of God. Indeed, the
 
linkage between religious hierarchical status and national
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leadership in many states is inseparable.
 
The second form, "power-imperialism is, in a word,
 
19
 
the wish to dominate for the sake of dominating." This
 
element can be seen throughout recorded time as societies
 
experience an upsurge in the level of nationalism. Because
 
of the quantitative increase in nationalism and its
 
transmission into force, Maunier believes that the joy
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of force itself becomes a good. For power imperialism
 
to arise, racial primacy and cultural superiority must
 
be a publicly held ideology. Thus, due to a collective
 
and a reverent sense of primal superiority, the group seeks
 
to reaffirm its greatness through the search for glory.
 
Therefore, group superiority or 'primacy* gives power
 
imperialism its dimension to alter, rule, convert or to
 
enslave. Pivotal to group primacy is its foundation in
 
mystical beliefs. For example, the dogma of being a son
 
of God has led individuals to think that they are chosen
 
among men to lead mankind or, at maximum, they follow the
 
fallacy to the conclusion that they too are gods. Ultimately
 
this mystical primacy in the western world led to the
 
fallacious racial doctrine of Albinism or the superiority
 
of the white man.
 
The third form in Maunier's theoretical construct
 
is, "material imperialism" which is based on self-interest
 
rather than spiritual, cultural, or power primacy. Simply
 
put, it is the acquisition of booty and tribute taken away
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from the colonies and transferred to the motherland where
 
luxury goods are produced for the wealthy elite and the
 
petty bourgeois. There were two ways in which nation-states
 
increased their national wealth during most of the colonial
 
period: either through tribute or profit. Tribute includes
 
direct taxation or indirect taxation such as the high cost
 
associated with the importation of finished goods from
 
the home county. In order to exact the latter form of
 
tribute, most colonies were restricted to products
 
manufactured in the motherland. By law, this greatly
 
increased profits at home thus the extension of export
 
tribute, both in terms of increased markets and home
 
industrial growth, reinforced the domination of larger
 
land masses, better trade routes and the suppression of
 
colonial industrial growth.
 
Yet another factor behind material imperialism is
 
the transplantation or settlement of colonies with excess
 
members of the motherland's population. "If a state is
 
suffering from having too many citizens, you must make
 
your choice; either produce more food or emigrate."21 If,
 
however, the nation is unable to produce more food on
 
available lands, it was forced into importing goods which
 
at that time led to need for conquest.
 
Maunier's fourth and final form, "cultural
 
imperialism," lays claim to territory based on the
 
superiority of the conqueror's civilization. Cultural
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imperialism is not a new phenomena and is probably related
 
to notion of tribalistic primacy. Maunier believes that
 
cultural imperialism contains two reinforcing elements
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those of feelings and judgement.
 
Feelings lend support for the concept of national
 
superiority and the concomitant contempt for the inferior.
 
"When you despise the foreigner (native) you are led to
 
wish to re-^mold him"...."which leads to the idea that this
 
inferior can be, and ought to be, civilized."23 This
 
judgment provides yet another rationalization to rule.
 
Thus the ihdiginous peoples became linked to the perception
 
of development. By casting the natives as savages, at the
 
bottom of development, of as barbarians (not quite savages
 
but could be civilized With a little help), increased
 
intervention and ultimate domination was butressed.
 
A question then arises concerning the desirability
 
of assimilation as a method of conquests I believe that
 
this method of conquest-- particularly for the French who
 
viewed being French the best thing they could do for you—
 
was rooted in the philosophy of the times. Between the
 
late 1800's and early 1900's the colonialists believed
 
that they had a moral obligation as civilized people to
 
force the subjugated to accept the Western ideology of
 
progress and rule of law. This meant the abolition of some
 
local customs and laws. These changes were buttressed in
 
later colonialism by the imposition of education and
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constant persuasion.
 
A factor that Maunier does not address is the relative
 
ease in which racism transcends socioeconomic development
 
as the primary factor for labeling individuals as savages
 
and making skin color the paramount criterion. Louis Snyder
 
argues that "racialism" is a recent phenomena and is the
 
direct result of modern nationalism and imperialism. He
 
contends that prior to the 16th century antagonisms between
 
people were based on "cultural, religious and linguistic
 
differences."^^ Racial differences were noticed as an
 
indirect result of the colonial neo-mercantilist class.
 
It is believed that white Europeans became increasingly
 
aware of their racial differences while subjugating black,
 
brown and red men.^^ In the spirit of Sir Charles Dilke,
 
who argued that "the gradual extinction of inferior races
 
is not only a law of nature but a blessing to mankind",
 
the 19th century the British began to see themselves as
 
racial saviors of the world. The myths that gave rise
 
to racial primacy were the mystical relationship to the
 
teutonic peoples and later. Social Darwinism. Social
 
Darwinism as a theory suggested that social systems were
 
governed by survival of the fittest both in terms of health
 
and development. Therefore, the weaker races would
 
eventually be replaced by the stronger and more efficient
 
ones.
 
The British were not the only nation to focus on
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cultural primacy. The French had believed in their racial
 
and cultural superiority. Indeed, they set their mystic
 
national identity on somatic and psychic characteristics.
 
Not to be out done, the Americans joined into the fray.
 
Senator Albert Beveridge a conservative Republican from
 
Indiana, in making the case for American annexation of
 
the Philippines in 1900, claimed that we should not abandon
 
the Orient because to do so would be to abandon the mission
 
of our "race, trustee, under God ,the civilization of the
 
world."27 Hence, the paternal nonsense of "our little brown
 
brother."
 
These racist theories culminated in the popular
 
supremacist belief that the other races were "the white
 
man's burden", and that the Anglo-Saxon males had an
 
obligation to "the weak, black races, the same sort of
 
obligation owed to women, children and dumb animals."28
 
Thus, race further legitimized European and American rule
 
and influence and gave order to societies based on racial
 
stratification. To support their divine right to rule
 
Westerners put on the air of being "God-like themselves
 
in the eyes of the natives. And if not quite God-like,
 
then at least in the relationship of masters to servants
 
or, a common theme, parents to children."29 One of the
 
more successful tools used by colonial powers to suppress
 
indigenous self-rule took advantage of the divisive
 
properties found in racisni itself and the sense of cultural
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superiority. The tool is known as divide and rule.
 
Divide and rule was an instrument of domination and
 
consisted in two forms: First, there was the
 
political division of linguistic groups into various smaller
 
units and then, the reassemblage of them into larger groups
 
that spoke different languages so that collusion against
 
the oppressor was made difficult. Secondly, old rivalries
 
among indigenous peoples were rekindled which further
 
divided the region into smaller units. Fundamental to the
 
central thesis of this paper, is the notion that the
 
colonialists were activity involved in undermining
 
indiginous unity through divid and rule. As Gladwin
 
explains:
 
By administrative action, colonial officers isolate
 
separate cultural or linguistic groups which are
 
Competing for power or territory, or even encourage
 
such when it scarcely exists; sometimes pairs of
 
individual leaders of factions can be used in the
 
same way. Help is usually given to the weaker of
 
the two ,thus making the struggle even more intense.
 
By carefully controlling the amount of aid and
 
encouragement so that the two groups remain about
 
even and neither side can win, the energies of
 
both will be dissipated without any being left
 
over to combat the larger enemy.
 
Divide and rule was also accomplished indirectly.
 
Indirect rule occurred in administrative systems where
 
existing native chiefs implemented colonial policies at
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the village level rather than white colonial officers.
 
This form of rule used the remnants of the traditional
 
indigenous systems and, as such, needed to be implemented
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immediately prior to the disintegration of that society.
 
Recruitment of local chiefs involved using a "combination
 
of pressure, perhaps threats, inducements and playing upon
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the chiefs sense of responsibility to his tribe." Because
 
the indirect method deceptively responed to the demand
 
for local traditional control, it insured a reasonable
 
amount of safety for the foreign administrators. Even if
 
problems arose, native troops from elsewhere in the region
 
handled the unrest. The damage inflicted by this form of
 
rule had profound psychological and, later, political
 
effects.
 
Often indirect rule was established through a series
 
of treaties in which liguored chiefs signed away the control
 
of their lands to fbreign owned companies. In signing the
 
treaties, the chiefs pledged not to deal with any strangers
 
except the company and, in return, the company pledged
 
to protect the chiefs from outside attacks and not to change
 
the native laws or customs. But the chiefs did have to
 
submit to the company's demand of being a court of last
 
appealj a move that gave the company almost deity status.
 
Lastly, divide and rule takes its final form in the
 
arbitrary manner in which borders were drawn. Often the
 
colonial borders cut across tribal boundaries causing states
 
to be formed by combining cultures that were not compatible
 
with each other. This was done more often than not to
 
protect colonial realestate rather than human investment.
 
28
 
As George Shepherd points out, "Almost every new nation
 
—and not a few old ones—is now more or less painfully
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hung on this kind of centrifuge." Examples of but a
 
few states with diverse and hostile populations including:
 
(1) the Sudanese civil war between the light skinned Arab
 
northerners and the black non-Muslim southerners; (2)
 
engagements between the Kurds and Iran, Iraq and Turkey;
 
(3) the reamergence of Christian and Muslim struggles in
 
the Russian Federationn addition to the indiginous
 
separatists movements among the republics; and (4) the
 
divisions among light-skinned northerners and dark-skinned
 
southerners in India. Isaacs contends that if we were
 
to examine further evidence of strife induced by the impact
 
of colonial boundaries on tribes and other groups we would
 
have to consider "Nigeria, the Congo, India in Assam and
 
Nagaland, Indonesia in Borneo, the Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan
 
irredehtism,(and) the high permeability of the frontiers
 
of all the countries of the Indochina peninsula." These
 
policies and the flagrant disregard for indigenous
 
boundaries adumbrate and act on the borders of many modern
 
nation states; states whose borders and future were designed
 
and sealed by colonial powers.
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THE EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM ON THE PRESENT NATION STATE
 
SYSTEM
 
Border Conflicts
 
As alluded to above/ nations, and often political
 
organizations, are based on divisions of the earth's
 
surface. In most cases these borders are represented by
 
geographic barriers such as lakes, mountains and rivers,
 
and sometimes these lines have been drawn irrespective
 
of cultures or linguistic groupings. Perhaps more cases
 
of homogenous societies being forced into heterogeneous
 
states are found on the continent of Africa than anywhere
 
else. Furthermore, Duchaek holds that when the Europeans
 
"were in the process of establishing their colonial empires
 
in Africa, they subdivided the whole continent arbitrarily
 
among themselves, usually proceeding from the coast into
 
the interior, and in doing so,they cut across all
 
traditional boundaries."
 
The General Act of the Berlin Conference held in 1885
 
is responsible for much of the face of modern Africa. Under
 
the Treaty, Europeans divided Africa into spheres of
 
influence which ultimately led to the creation of borders
 
for many modern nation states. The compact resolved and
 
established: (1) free trade among nations in the Congo
 
Basin; (2)the suppression of slave trade and slave markets;
 
(3) established neutrality for the territories of the Congo;
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(4) navigation on both the Congo and Niger rivers; and
 
(5) the rules for additional occupation of the coasts of
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Africa.
 
By the end of 1917 the future of muslim lands in the
 
Middle East had been determined by European powers. The
 
first commitment was given by the British to Sharif Husayan
 
and his three sons. In the Husayan-McMahon correspondence
 
(1915-1916), the British agreed to divide up the Arabian
 
peninsula and reward Husayan for his help in defeating
 
the Ottoman Empire. The second, was the Sykes-Picot
 
(1915—1916) agreement, which divided the Ottoman Empire
 
between the British, French and Russians into spheres of
 
influence, while actual borders were drawn at the San Remo
 
conference in 1920. The first two agreements were made
 
in secret, but the future of the Middle East struggle was
 
sealed in 1917 by the British Balfour Declaration, which
 
in effect promised Palestine to the European Jewish Zionists
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as a national home.
 
When borders impdsed by foreign powers cut through
 
ethnic or tribal groups, two problems are produced. The
 
first conflict is irredentist, that is, a group's desire
 
to reunify with its ethnic counter part located within
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the borders of another country. The second conflict involves
 
separatist elements that wish to succeed from the malformed
 
state and press their demands through civil unrest and
 
terrorism. Both the Kurds and the Armenians are good
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examples of both the irredentist and separatist mpvements.
 
The Kurds have fought to unify their tribal region, which
 
has been divided between Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The same
 
holds true for the Armenians who are separated by the
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Turkish and Armenian borders. The focus for Armenian
 
autonomy may be shifting since the struggle between
 
Armenians with Azeris has emerged within the Russian
 
Federation over Nagorno-Karabakh. Conversely, border
 
disputes help national leaders garner public support by
 
waving the flag of nationalism. The motive behind border
 
wars may be to shift the focus away from the real problem
 
and/or to unite factiohs behind new policies. Therefore,
 
most border disputes are placed on the back burner until
 
a dose of nationalism is called for. This is particularly
 
true where economics is involved and commodities are just
 
across the border (see table 2.1).
 
Aside from the principle of consent, state authority
 
is often the result of people being forced to recognize
 
the state's domination either through the state's
 
progressive use of force or through a power transfer. Thus,
 
"the existence of a political boundary is itself a major
 
contribution to a sense of solidarity. Among the most
 
important experiences that can unite a group is that they
 
share the same government."^® Although some nations share
 
the same languages and cultural heritage, if the divisions
 
between the states are externally imposed the divisions
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may harden into place and win general acceptance. For
 
example homogenous populations split and become new
 
political states, such as. North and South Korea, and Taiwan
 
and the Peoples Republic of China. Nevertheless, there
 
is the propensity for homogenous groups to reunite, such
 
as East and West Germany.
 
Racial strife
 
The existence of racism is an important element that
 
is frequently passed by Western scholars. Indeed, Middle
 
Eastern scholar Edward Said attacks the Western scholars
 
in his book Orientalism (1978) for not recognizing the
 
role of racism. He holds that this omission is rooted in
 
the perpetuation of European Imperialism. The study of
 
racism is also important because our modern world "took
 
its political shape when racialism was at its height."41
 
"It was, after all, well into this century, and not at
 
the height of Victorian imperial enthusiasm, that President
 
Franklin Roosevelt put forward his schemes for the
 
inter-breeding of European and Asian stock to produce a
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less delinquent Asian race... Moreover, after WWII all
 
of the seventy-five newly formed nation states were
 
non-caucasoidi Hugh Tinker claims, "that today, transcending
 
everything (including the nuclear threat), there is the
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confrontation between races. In f^ct, U.S. policies
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TABLE 2.1
 
Some Territorial Disputes of Third World States
 
Postwar Disputes Involving Armed Conflict, with Years Begun—
 
Over creation of new states
 
India-Pakistan, 1947
 
India-Hyderabad, 1947
 
Arab States-Israel, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973
 
Indonesia- Malaysia, 1963
 
Pakistan-Kashmir, 1965
 
India/Bangladesh-Pakistan, 1 971
 
Other
 
Eire-Northern Ireland, 1945
 
Afghanistan-Pakistan, 1950
 
Saudi Arabia-Abu Dhabi and Muscat, 1952
 
Cambodia-Thailand, 1953
 
China-India, 1954 (full-scale war 1962)
 
China-Burma, 1956
 
Nicaragua-Honduras, 1957
 
Egypt-Sudan, 1 958
 
Iraq-KUwait, 1962, 1 990^^
 
Morocco-Algeria, 1963
 
Somalia-Kenya, 1963
 
Somalia-Ethiopia, 1963, 1 977^^
 
Argentina-Chile, 1963
 
Morocco (/Mauritania to 1978)- Western Sahara, 1976^
 
China-Vietnam, 1979, 1983^
 
Iran-Iraq, 1 980^^
 
Ecuador-Peru, 1981
 
Argentina-Britain/Falkland Islands, 1982
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TABLE 2.1
 
(continued)
 
Some Other Disputes/Claims
 
Iran, to Bahrain^
 
Somalia to Djibouti
 
Philippines, to Sabah (Malaysia)
 
Libya, to northwest Ghad
 
United Arab Emirates, to islands currently held by Iran
 
Bolivia, to a corridor to the sea through Chile
 
Argentina and Chile, to islands in the Beagle Channel
 
Venezuela and Colombia, to Gulf of Maracaibo
 
Venezuela, to two-thirds of Guyana
 
Nicaragua, to islands held by Colombia
 
Argentina and Chile (among others), to Antarctica
 
^ Data to 1971 are drawn from Evan Luard, ed.. The
 
International Regulation of Frontier Disputes (New York;
 
Praeger, 1970): 8-9.
 
^ Situations in which armed conflict is still
 
occurring.
 
Formally dropped in 1 970 but still occasionally noted,
 
From: Jaqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner Interpreting the Third
 
World: Politics, Economics and Social Issues, (New York:
 
Praeger, 1986) p. 102.
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have been partially impacted by the outbreak of tribal
 
and racial wars which have forced the Western nations to
 
make choices based on racial grounds in rather than the
 
rule of law. For example, the current suppression of the
 
Palestinian people is similar to that of the black South
 
Africans. Both of the combatants are baisically indiginous
 
peoples struggling against primarily European racial stock,
 
however the U.S. policy partially embargoes only the white
 
ruled apartheid. Some have observed that the policy probably
 
has more to do with pressure from America's large black
 
population than a commitment for social justice held by
 
our leaders.
 
Racism is an emotional attitude, a symptom of
 
insecurity, which transforms itself into a creed. The
 
causes of racial prejudice are: (1) economic needs or
 
rivalries; (2) its manipulation by political leaders to
 
extend their own power; (3) social-cultural differences
 
between groups of people ; (4)an us versus them xenophobic
 
mentality; (5) religious differences that fester into racial
 
conflicts and (6) the physical traits of other peoples.
 
It is also important to include language in this category
 
since groups may share common customs, but distain anothers
 
language. An example of this linguistic form of prejudice
 
is presently occuring in Canada where the French speaking
 
Quebecois and English Canadians have long expressed
 
differences,sometimes violent, over the use, role and
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application of language in Canada.
 
Language plays an important role in determining the
 
way individuals and cultures perceive the world around
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them through the use of description and idioms. Language
 
can act as a hindrance to state unification, while on the
 
other hand, linguistic commonalities often forge closer
 
ties. Shared languages also tend to draw citizens of one
 
state closer to those in another state because, unlike
 
others, they share something in common. 47 As Snyder points
 
out there are; however, several fallacies concerning
 
language and race: "{1)that language ties people together
 
with the same characteristics; (2) the ability to speak
 
the language represents a superior mental and physical
 
capabilities of the race; and (3) a language that is widely
 
spoken throughout the world reveals a higher level of
 
civilizing by those who speak it." Most of these fallacies
 
were believed tq be true under Social Darwinism and can
 
still be found.
 
Modernization
 
I address the process of modernization because I think
 
that its effects on the social structure of the
 
underdeveloped world are largely the result of colonial
 
policies that have contributed to the suppression of local
 
industry and have inhibited access to Western technology.
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As I have noted, colonial policies were designed to maintain
 
economic dominance even after departure and, although these
 
policies are no longer directly enforced, they continue
 
to exert a certain degree of influence.
 
Social arid economic theorists have long thought that
 
as science advanced so too would mankind. But men are
 
advancing technologically while still retaining their
 
traditional social structures keyed to indiginous religous
 
and mystic belief systems. Moreover, much of the earth's
 
population has renewed its interest in re—tribalizing into
 
distinct ethno-linguistic blocks which has the effect of
 
further fragmenting states. Pivotal to this tribal
 
renaissance is the ayailability, use and application of
 
technology and mass communication. No other factor divides
 
the world like technology. It appears as though a small
 
percentage of the earth is pushing full tilt into the
 
technological age, with computers, tractors, and high speed
 
transportation, while others use yesterday's calculators,
 
bullock-drawn implements and inadequate transportation
 
systems. Still others, lost in confusion, remain aloof
 
and use evenmore primative levels of technology.
 
The problem with technology is particularly acute
 
in the developing world where rapid modernization is taking
 
place. Unlike industrialized states, where change has been
 
absorbed gradually and successfully over two-hundred years,
 
the developing world has had to adjust in a brief period
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of thirty years! In addition, technological catch-up becomes
 
increasingly more difficult for underdeveloped nations
 
because of geometric increases in both information and
 
the advance of technology.
 
As Deutch points out, the effects of modernization
 
can be charterized as, a "process by which major clusters
 
of old social, economic and psychological commitments are
 
eroded or broken and people become available for new
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patterns of behavior." The change of these cultural
 
factors directly ties too and impacts social stability.
 
Writing in 1982 Chalmers Johnson suggests that, several
 
factors contribute to the maintenance of social stability.
 
He believes that for societies to remain stable, members
 
must realize there will be inequities in wealth, power
 
and status and that they willingly accept these inequities.
 
He further contends that men accept these inequalities
 
because social values have taught them to do so. Thus,
 
the key factor for stability in a society is the maintenance
 
of existing values. Any change in the system that is not
 
in harmony with the social norms places the society in
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a state of disequilibrium.
 
Johnson argues that, on the other hand, societies
 
that have long term equilibrium have fulfilled the following
 
four functions: (1) values and norms have been effectively
 
transmitted to children and immigrants; (2) society has
 
adapted to changes in terms of both economics and the
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physical setting of the society; (3) there has been
 
effective allocation of resources and policies which best
 
reflect the good of society as a whole; and (4) there is
 
integration of basic values between the layers of society
 
and a desire for restraint of those deviating from the
 
norm. 
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All of these social functions were, of
 
course, destroyed or largely disrupted under colonial rule.
 
Most societies are able to remain in equilibrium in spite
 
of change; but in societies that have experienced little
 
change for a long time, even a minor change can be quite
 
destabilizing. The problem facing these societies is that
 
changes, and their reaction to them, tend to continue and
 
multiply rather than die out after the orginal disturbance
 
thus throwing the society into further disequilibrium.
 
Johnson has concluded that disequilibrium and multiple
 
dysfunctions result in either new policies or revolution
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as societies seek equilibruim.
 
Responses to colonialism and Third World solidarity
 
In 1955 twenty-four countries met in Bandung Indonesia
 
and held a conference on Asian-African affairs. Represented
 
were: Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India,
 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon,
 
Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
 
Syria, Thailand, Turkey, North Vietnam and Yemen. The
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 conference addressed economics, culture, human rights and
 
the most important issue of its time, self-determination.
 
With repect to colonialism the Conference agreed:
 
(A) that colonialism in all its manifestations
 
is an evil which should speedily be brought to
 
an end;
 
(B) affirmed that subjugation, domination,
 
and exploitation, constitutes a denial of fund-

mental human rights, is contrary to the Charter
 
of the United Nations and is ah impediment to the
 
promotion of world peace and cooperation;
 
(C) declared its support of the cause of freedom
 
and independence for all such people, and;
 
(D) called upon the powers to grant freedom
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and independence to all such peoples.
 
The importance behind the Bandung Conference was that
 
it represented the beginnings of the Non Aligned Movement.
 
These political forces later evolved into regional as well
 
as international Pan Arab, Pan Islam and Pan African
 
movements.
 
. I ■ 
The second expression of Thifd World solidarity was
 
the 1958 All-African People's Conference. The participants
 
came from twenty-eight countries ^ nd non-government
 
entities. Meeting in Ghana to discuss their respective
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problems, they declared that the African Continent had
 
been arbitrarily divided up by foreign powers to the
 
detriment of indigenous Africans. The participants concluded
 
that Africans had gone through two phases of colonialism.
 
In the first phase, their lands were taken and owned by
 
foreigners and, in the second, they were suppressed by
 
white immigrarits who effectively used their own black
 
military to crush indigenous revolutionary forces. The
 
Conference concluded with the condemnation of "colonialism
 
and imperialism in whatever shape or form these evils are
 
perpetuated."^'^ Finally, the conference sanctioned:
 
its full support to all fighters for freedom in Africa,
 
to all those who resort to peaceful means of
 
non-violence and civil disobedience as well as to
 
all those who are compelled to retaliate against
 
violence to attain national independence and freedom
 
for the people.
 
Reactions to indigenous self-determination and independence
 
Neocolonialism signifies colonialism gone full circle
 
because, like mercantilism, it represents economic dominance
 
or control as the force behind conquest. It uses newer
 
techniques than traditional forms of imperialism but with
 
the same destructive results. As Walter Langsam points
 
out the tools imperialists use are: "leaseholds and
 
concessions, spheres of influence and interest,
 
protectorates, financial and tariff control,
 
extraterritoriality and, finally mandates. The chief
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institutions of neocolonialism have been the transnational
 
corporations which are generally based in the developed
 
world.
 
Neocolonialism as an adjustment to earlier policies
 
began after WW II when most of the industrialized nations
 
recognized that unrest and cries for independence by their
 
colonies was imminent. As a result, they redesigned their
 
policies toward their colonies to assure themselves of
 
economic primacy after colonial independence. In preparation
 
for withdrawal, imperialist nations followed several steps
 
to insure their continued economic dominance over their
 
colonies. Professor Chinweizw assigns these steps
 
to certain geographic locations but they may be correctly
 
viewed as global:
 
(1) Africanizing the colonial administrative
 
bureaucracy- a process whereby the central colonial
 
administrative machinery as well as the various
 
native administration, would be delivered into
 
the hands of an educated African petite-bourgeois
 
mandarate,
 
(2) Training the cream of the African petite-

bourgeois politicians in the ways and means of
 
European liberal capitalist democracy;
 
(3) Selecting and guiding into power some faction
 
of the petite-bourgeois to whom the legitimizing
 
instruments of colonial power would be transferred
 
at the end of the tutelage; and
 
(4) Greating the most controllable political units
 
by federating some colonial units here and breaking
 
up others there.
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CONCLUSIONS
 
Colonialism and the tools of Imperialism have left
 
a legacy of: border wars; raDial wars; irredentist
 
conflicts; wars for national liberation that are often
 
fought unconventionally; notions of cultural supremacy
 
of the white race; meshed religion with nationalism; and
 
deprived underdeveloped countries of new technology early
 
on in their societies developiment and then later indirectly
 
reduced the time for them to readjust to newer innovations,
 
All of the above have led to a path of multiple dysfunctions
 
in the underdeveloped world vhich produces a seemingly
 
never ending cycle of coups, mass revolutions, and elite
 
intransigence.
 
In order to correct past injustices, industrialized
 
nations need to recognize their roles in establishing and
 
contributing to many of the aggressive forces found in
 
the Third World today. COloniLzation has set a chaotic course
 
for the world by arbitrarily drawing lines across the planet
 
which often divide indigenous peoples into separate and
 
hostile nations. Moreover, tle implementation of divide
 
and rule has set those tribes and families who are in power
 
against the wishes of indigenous inhabitants causing
 
additional social dysfunctiops which are then reflected
 
in regional disputes.
 
Contemporary affairs are the logical extension of
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colonial policies buttressed by Realism. It could be argued
 
that one of the functions served by Realism is to legitimize
 
colonial rule. Realists contend, national interest can
 
be defined as national power. Accordingly, for nation-states
 
to maintain their viability they must pursue their military
 
and economic interests. Thus, realists assert there are
 
no morals that can be applied universally to govern an
 
anarchical world. In fact, the only "good" policy is one
 
that maintains state sovereignty. These precepts effectively
 
dismiss colonial domination and serve as the subject of
 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
 
REALISM
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The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the
 
predominant school of international thought known as
 
Realism. The section discusses what Realists believe in
 
general by; defining the keystone on which their argument
 
bears, namely that national power is national interest;
 
examines the Realist position on international trade; and
 
concludes with the Realists' stance on morality and
 
international politics.
 
Classical European theory assumes the state is the
 
fundamental unit of international politics and exists as
 
a hard-shelled unit with all human activities, political
 
and nonpolitical, occurring in isolation and unrelated
 
to e^vents transpiring beyond their borders.1 Classicism
 
buttressed strategic balance of power theories which saw
 
the international arena as an anarchic environment in which
 
each state sought to maintain or maximize its power for
 
fear of military domination by outside forces.2 These
 
thoughts are reflected in the writings of, international
 
relations theorists known as Realists.
 
Realists believe history has taught us that
 
international laws and organizations are limited in worth.
 
They contend that there are no mutual long-term interests
 
that can galvanize nation-states together because states
 
have conflicts in their national objectives, that is,
 
conflicts that are reinforced by states asserting
 
international policies that are dictated by the different
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capabilities which they posses.^ These capabilities consist
 
of many elements besides military power including: levels
 
of technology, geography, demographics, national resources,
 
potential leadership, type of government, and national
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ideology.
 
In addition. Realists claim that international politics
 
cannot act as any standard bearer of ethics. They presume
 
that man is an evil creature who hungers for power and
 
whose nature has been set by divine providence. Therefore
 
little can be accomplished through voluntary forms of
 
international law or education to change man's greedy
 
nature. Furthermore, Realists assert that the best way
 
for men to achieve peace is by instituting a system that
 
pits their nasty and brutish natures against each other
 
as depicted by Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes.
 
Through this interplay, it is assumed that nations become
 
motivated by self interest to maintain the equilibrium
 
and refrain from attacking each other. What follows is
 
a discussion of each of the pertinent elements outlined
 
above. This will be accomplished by first addressing the
 
Realists' concerning the international polity.
 
According to Richard Mansbach, the Realist paradigm
 
can be broken into three fundamental assumptions:
 
(1) Nation-states and/or their decision-makers
 
are the most important set of actors to examine
 
in order to account for the behavior in
 
international politics.
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(2) Political life is bifurcated into "domestic"
 
and "international" spheres, each subject to its
 
own characteristic traits and laws of behavior.
 
(3) International relations is the struggle for
 
power and peace. This struggle constitutes a single
 
issue occurring in a single system and entails
 
a ceaseless and repetitive competition for the
 
single stake of power. Understanding how and why
 
that struggle occurs and suggesting ways for ^
 
regulating it is the purpose of the discipline.
 
In addition to Mansbach's findings, I believe that
 
Realists share a fourth assumption which focuses on the
 
notion that history has, and is, an active teacher of
 
foreign policy. That is, the behavior of states in their
 
relations with other states have conformed to certain
 
patterns throughout history and will continue to do so.
 
This assumption is accentuated in the works of Realist
 
George Kennan who basis his theory on historical materials
 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However
 
the recurring patterns of historical behavior should not
 
be misinterpreted as contributing to science. Nor is this
 
historical issue to be construed that there is a single
 
cause that determines international relations. Rather,
 
causes might more rightfully be seen as multiple, and the
 
result of anarchy or the struggle for power. In fact,
 
Idealists and the so-called reformers are faulted for
 
seeking a "single cause and the scientific formula to remedy
 
it...""^
 
Hans Morgenthau further clarifies the Realist's position
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in his book Politics Among Nations where he outlines six
 
principles of realism. First he claims, "that politics,
 
like society in general, is governed by objective laws
 
Q
 
that have their roots in human nature." Accordingly, to
 
understand or even improve man's condition we must focus
 
upon the fact that societies are governed by laws that
 
have been determined by human nature and cultural mores
 
in some objective manner no matter how imperfect they might
 
seem. This leads Morgenthau to deduce that politics is
 
rooted in human nature which lends to the former's
 
character. Thus, politics is at best imperfect, reflecting
 
man's imperfect nature. While he acknowledges that the
 
law of human nature was built upon the philosophies of
 
ancient civilizations, he hastens to add that scholars
 
should not discard the theory simply because of the passage
 
of time. Realism then, seeks objectivity and to distinguish
 
truth from opinion. To accomplish this objectivity. Realists
 
garner facts and give them meaning through reason. However,
 
the dissection of facts does not in itself complete nor
 
satisfy the inquiry into human nature. Morgenthau suggests
 
that when we study foreign policy an eye must be kept on
 
the humaness of statesmen pursuing policy. By inserting
 
the human factor into the discipline of international
 
relations we not only add to the factual meaning of the
 
field but can also, through role playing, determine what
 
alternatives are open and most likely to be chosen by
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statesman.
 
Mogenthau's seeond assumption is that under the realist
 
paradigm the fundamental unit of analysis "is interest
 
10
 defined in terms of power." This concept links reason
 
with facts and separates politics aside from other non
 
political issues "such as economics (understood in terms
 
of interest defined as wealth) ethics, aesthetics or
 
religion. Thus, for a politician to be called a statesman
 
he ought to act in terms of interest defined as power.
 
Thinking as a statesman Realists must then must reject
 
"the concern with motives and the concern with ideological
 
preferences" since a politician may act on morally good
 
motives yet, nevertheless, produce morally indefensible
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results. Morgenthau claims, such is the case of Neville
 
Chamberlain, who acted on moral grounds of pursuing peace
 
and subsequently, made World War II inevitable. Thus
 
Morgenthau argues, that while "good motives give assurance
 
against deliberately bad policies; they do not guarantee
 
the moral goodness and political success of the policies
 
they inspire." Concomitantly, Realists avoid philosophic
 
penchants and focus upon the "official duty" as compared
 
to the more normative "personal wish" which would expand
 
personal moral and political values. Separation from this
 
normative desire aids in fostering rationality as opposed
 
to coloring academic inquiry.
 
Third, Morgenthau contends that the operational
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definitions of national interests and national power are
 
not static. While men are motivated by self interests/
 
these interests are changed periodically along with foreign
 
policy and the movement of time. Likewise, power may also
 
change its tactics while retaining the simple premise that
 
power is the "domination of man by man".14 Lastly, he makes
 
the case that prevailing political conditions are not fixed
 
and will continue to fluctuate with the ever changing
 
balance of power as the international political system
 
seeks new equilibriums.
 
Fourth, Morgenthau believes that universal principles
 
are not abstractly applicable to foreign policy. They argue
 
that the state has a responsibility to safeguard the lives
 
and property of its citizens even though individuals within
 
the state may opt to perish over pursuing policies of
 
injustice as a matter of conscience. But, as Morgenthau
 
points out, "successful political action itself (is)
 
inspired by the moral principle of national survival."1 5
 
Further, he claims there can be no political morality
 
without prudence and believes "the weighing of the
 
consequences of alternative political actions-to be the
 
supreme virtue in politics" ^ and as such replaces morality
 
with reasoning.
 
The fifth postulate holds that any affirmation of
 
universal morality and its impact on political actions
 
is spurious. In fact, to equate morality with policy making
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is to distort sound judgment and subject states to self
 
destruction. Destruction which is foreshadowed by the moral
 
principle of god himself. However, Morgenthau recognize
 
that few nations have been able to resist the temptation
 
to equate their political actions as the result of high
 
moral aspirations or divine inspiration.
 
Sixth, Morgenthau argues that politics ought to have
 
primacy when compared to other spheres such as economics,
 
law and moral principles. Therefore, in the words of
 
Morgenthau, "political realism takes issue with the
 
'legalistic-moralistic approach' to international
 
17 . .
politics." This is not to discard other disciplines but
 
that Realists must examine them in there proper function.
 
Because this issue is difficult for some readers to grasp,
 
Morgenthau uses three historical examples of which two
 
are summarized as follows. In the first example, he
 
illustrates the legalistic approach by discussing the Soviet
 
attack on Finland in 1939 and the responses elicited from
 
France and Great Britain^ Both states were legally
 
responsible for the joint defense of Finland under the
 
Covenant of the League of Nations, however Sweden refused
 
to allow troops to pass through their territory. Had Sweden
 
permitted entry, France and Great Britain would have been
 
at war with the Soviet Union and Germany simultaneously.
 
From the Realist perspective, France and Great Britain
 
errored in that, "instead of asking both questions, that
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of law and of power, they asked only the question of law;
 
and the answer they received could have no bearing on the
 
issue that their very existence might have depended upon."1ft
 
The second example, the moralistic approach, examines the
 
rise of Communist China and the Western reaction. Morgenthau
 
believes that the Western world was confronted with two
 
questions, one moral, and the other political. Rather than
 
rely on power to determine policy, the negative answer
 
came in the moral refusal to accept China's rejection of
 
Western morality. Morgenthau asserts this egregious error
 
"to arrive at this conclusion by neglecting this test
 
altogether and answering the political question in terms
 
of the moral issue was indeed a classic example of the
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moralistic approach to international politics.
 
Hedley Bull agrees with Morgenthau's second assumption
 
and contributes to the Realist school by identifying order
 
as the common theme shared among nation-states. He posits
 
that five elements effect international order "first there
 
is the goal of preservation of the system and the society
 
of states itself."20 Whatever differences there may be
 
between nation-states, the states have always clung to
 
the belief that each shares the responsibility for
 
protecting the system itself. The second element Bull offers
 
is that nation-states share the common goal of maintaining
 
their individual independence and national sovereignty.
 
But collectively they may see the demise of individual
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states as "subordinate to preservation of the society of
 
states itself: this reflects the predominant role played
 
in shaping international society by the great powers, which
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view themselves as its custodians." As a result many
 
small weaker states have been fed to the opposition in
 
hope of preserving the balance of power.
 
The third element of Bull's hypothesis is that
 
the states share desire for peace. This is not an
 
establishment of universal or lasting peace but only the
 
absence of war which may, from time to time, be breached
 
as nefeded to re-establish an international balance of power.
 
Thus he claims societies recognize and value the right
 
to wage war in order to maintain the survivability of the
 
system itself; juxtaposing peace with common safety and
 
security.
 
Fourth, and common to all states, is the protection
 
and limitation of violence which results in "death or bodily
 
harm, the keeping of promises and the stabilization of
 
possession by rules of property. By this Bull means
 
that: (1) states cooperate to maintain their monopoly of
 
violence, and deny the right to employ it to other groups.;
 
(2) accept that using violence against embassies as taboo;
 
and (3) have consistently agreed to the rules of war.
 
International promises, on the other hand, are usually
 
entered into with good intent. However, if the treaty
 
dissolves the international sphere readjusts and continues
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to accept treaties by "salvaging the principle itself."
 
Finally, Bull assumes that states operate by a "mutual
 
recognition of sovereignty (property)" which has been
 
derived from a historical past in which "certain territories
 
,,24
 
and peoples were the property or patrimony of the ruler.
 
In sum, what Bull's theory argues is that states have
 
established a system of order from chaos and, like
 
Morgenthau, he believes that"man responds to social
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situations with repetitive patterns." He argues that
 
while the present system is not Utopian it is the best
 
we can hope to achieve relegating man to reoccurring
 
patterns of institutional behavior and thus implying that
 
history is "static" or "circular".
 
Defining National Power as National Interest
 
The efficient use of power by nation-states is the
 
cornerstone on which the Realist argument bears. Therefore,
 
it is necessary to define national power and national
 
interest in the Realist context. Although there is no
 
consensual definition of power we can safely assume as
 
does Morgenthau, that it involves domination of man over
 
man.^^ By operationalizing this definition we can see
 
similarities among Realists in their application of power.
 
For example, Nicholas J. Spykman claims that power moves
 
mankind through "persuasion, purchase, barter, and
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coercion."27 Klaus Knorr contends that power is "only (the)
 
exercise of coercive influence" and is primarily the domain
 
of the military.28 Although K.J, Holsti's specific
 
definition consists of three parts in which he identifies
 
power as: "(1) The acts by which one actor influences
 
another actor; (2) the capabilities utilized for this
 
purpose: and (3) the response elicited." He too claims
 
that by-in-large it is the "general capacity of a state
 
to control the behavior of others."2Q if power is only
 
exercised coercively, as Knorr suggests, and it is primarily
 
military, then the preservation of a railitarily defeated
 
state would be an act of magnanimity by the victor. However,
 
if we hold to Holsti's action-reaction hypothesis we find
 
that self-interest motivates the vietor as it searches
 
for order while, on the other hand, self-preservation
 
motivates the defeated state. Such is the case of the recent
 
defeat of Iraq by the allied forces. Rather than suffer
 
instability and perhaps an even greater nemesis, the allies
 
withheld military support at the early end of the war to
 
both the Shi''ites bf the south and the Kurds of the north.
 
Having defined po#et we must^^l it to the, often
 
in defiance concept of, "national interest". However, we
 
must illuminate the term national interest because as Jack
 
Piano points out in the following definition it ought to
 
referred to as national interests.
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The national interest of a state is typiGally a
 
highly generalized conception of those elements
 
that constitute the state's most vital needs. These
 
include self-preservation, independence, territorial
 
integrity, military security, and economic well
 
being. Because no single interest dominates the
 
policy-making functions of a government, the concept
 
might be referred to more accurately in the plural
 
as national interests.
 
How then is power linked to interest? Simply it is
 
the need or desire to protect any of the interests listed
 
above by what ever means are efficient and necessary. Also,
 
the contrapositive is true. That is, when national interests
 
are strong, national power is strengthened. Thus, one cannot
 
exist without the other and when one is weakened the other
 
follows. In fact, one might conclude that a state's
 
objectives expand after ah increased levels of power have
 
been attained and therefore a country's objectives are
 
or ought to be reduced after it suffers a loss of power.
 
This premise gives credence to periods of colonialism that
 
were followed by intense periods of nationalism and creation
 
of international organizations to control power.
 
International Organizations
 
Realists believe international organizations and
 
international trade are limited in their ability to provide
 
international order and global cohesion. Kenneth Waltz
 
asserts that many economists and political scientists have
 
incorrectly assumed that interdependence between nations
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is on the rise due to the growth of the multinational
 
corporations.^^
 
Waltz believes that scholars have made an error in
 
assuming that international trade will promote international
 
detente. He claims that theorists make a mistake by looking
 
at international trade as though it was fixed in time and
 
by not contrasting present day volume of trade with those
 
of previous economic periods. For example, current trade
 
among the two super powers is meager; this was not the
 
case in the years prior to WWI when the two major powers
 
Great Britain and Germany were primary trading partners.
 
He reasons that additional trade between countries will
 
not solve international struggles for power. Moreover data
 
shows that interdependence between developed and lesser
 
developed nations has actually been reduced when we take
 
into account GNP growth. According to Waltz there has been
 
a rise in GNP among the developed nations while there has
 
been a simultaneous decrease in the demand for primary
 
products produced in Under Developed Countries (UDC's).
 
As a result of GNP growth, "trade among developed countries
 
accounted for 37.2 %of world trade; 12 years later the
 
amount had increased to 46.5 % (during the same
 
period) trade of less-developed with developed countries
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accounted for 19.3 % (and later) decreased to 14 %."
 
Therefore, Waltz is claiming that current ties between
 
developed and UDC's are less strong than those fostered
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under imperialism.
 
Waltz further rebuffs those who lay claim to the
 
importation of raw materials from UDC's as a case for
 
interdependence. Although developed nations do import large
 
quantities of raw materials "the quantity of imports is
 
not just a function of scarcity it is also a matter of
 
price." Thus, trade between developed and underdeveloped
 
nations do not constitute dependence but may in fact
 
represent; (1) reliability of supply rather than exclusive
 
possession of a resource; (2) a vast number of suppliers
 
which means fewer profits for the exporters and less
 
dependence by importers; (3) the hoarding of raw materials
 
which has rekindled production from many local producers;
 
and (4) using trade as a catalyst to substitute previously
 
imported goods with locally produced items.
 
Finally, Waltz attacks theorists who believe there
 
is a high degree of interdependence among nation-states.
 
He claims that for many theorists, "the rhetoric of
 
interdependence has taken on some of the qualities of an
 
ideology. This is accomplished when scholars by-pass
 
inequalities associated with an uneven national capabilities
 
and assume that trade arrangement are reciprocal.
 
Interdependence he says, forces each state to treat the
 
other's "acts as though they Were events within its own
 
borders" while dependence places each state in the role
 
of an adversary.36 Finally, he faults theorists for not
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taking into account the near self-^sufficiency of many
 
nation-states; many of whom have become insulated from
 
extreme shifts in the global economy.
 
In concert with Waltz, theorist Edward L. Morse claims
 
in his article "The Politics of Interdependence", given
 
the increased modernization of UDC's, there are two ways
 
theorists can view recent movements in international
 
relations: Either world politics is becoming more
 
interdependent or they are becoming more independent. Those
 
theorists that believe that the world is being shaped by
 
independence contend that the state remains the primary
 
actor and that increased levels of domestic transactions
 
act to buttress state sovereignty. On the other hand,
 
many theorists hold that modernization and concomitant
 
incres-ses in world trade h^ve made the world more
 
interdependent and as such leave nations more secure and
 
better off than they where before. Morse believes these
 
theorists are mistaken in their assumption because growth
 
in international trade,does not necessarily imply growth
 
in national security. He argues that this is because
 
international trade perpetuates the "absence of over arching
 
structures of authority, and the competition for survival,
 
and the maximization of power results inevitably in
 
conflict." Therefore, nations focus on, and are preoccupied
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with, national security.
 
In contrast to Waltz and Morse, Klaus Knorr argues
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less stridently that international trade is not producing
 
greater interdependence. In fact he states that "the
 
exercise of international power and influence takes place
 
II 39
in an increasingly interdependent world. He qualifies
 
his position by contending that:
 
To assume that growing international enmeshment
 
means the ascendance of global or regional over
 
national politics is very dubious, because the
 
process of modernization also strengthens domestic
 
integration and generates more demands for domestic
 
state action. Nor is it true that the process has,
 
so far at least, made interstate relations more
 
peaceful and accommodative.
 
His studies have led him to conclude that international
 
interdependence is characterized by asymmetries of wealth
 
that result in a disadvantage of poor and weaker states.
 
This causes the latter states to worry and be apprehensive
 
regarding the wealthier*s motives. In addition, economic
 
spillover effects from wealthier nations exacerbate
 
conditions further complicating the issue.41 Departing
 
from the mainstream of Realism, Knorr argues that the weaker
 
and poor nations should enjoy protection from poverty and
 
uneven power, "and that this protection should be rooted
 
in new universal norms and, based on these, administered
 
by international institutions."^^
 
Morality and the Realist
 
When discussing what some might label as an amoral
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point of view, it must be noted that Realism takes its
 
philosophical bearings on the works of Machiavelli*s The
 
Prxnce, and Hobbes' The Great Leviathan. Both argue that
 
it was necessary for leaders to have a different set of
 
morals for governing in an anarchical world. It is not
 
surprising that contemporary theorists and practitioners
 
take their philosophic mandates from these men because
 
like Machiavelli and Hobbes, they too see the need for
 
a strong state. More recently, and equally important, are
 
the works of Rienhold Neibuhr who, among others based his
 
arguments on the Bible. According to Niebuhr the Bible
 
assumes that all men were inherently evil. Thus he reasoned
 
that international problems were the direct result of men
 
trying to usurp God's divine authority. He coined this
 
as the "will to power" that mankind desired power for the
 
sake of having power. He believes that as an individual s
 
greed for power increases his aspiration to become
 
Christ-like diminishes. Thus, the trend toward immorality
 
compounds itself due to increases in the numbers of
 
individuals. Because of this "universal immorality", Niebuhr
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held that a balance of power must be struck to achieve
 
some fashion of order and justice. However it should be
 
pointed out that he did not entirely approve of certain
 
immoral methods used by statesmen.
 
Hans Morgenthau defines his arguments in a more
 
structured and prescriptive manner than does Reinhold
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Niebuhr. Morgenthau believes that morality gives man his
 
humanness and separates him from animals and argues that
 
there should be morality in domestic politics. Moreover,
 
he asserts that morality in domestic polity is of value
 
and "is not a utilitarian instrument aiming at the
 
protection of society, even though its observance has this
 
effect, but its commands are absolute and must be obeyed
 
for their own sake. Finally, Morgenthau looks at the
 
level in which the interplay occurs. He argues that at
 
the domestic level there are fewer numbers of men with
 
differing ideas as to what is moral. Since morals are
 
instituted by men they will differ from culture to culture
 
and from man to man. Therefore, Morgenthau deduced that
 
when the:
 
responsibility for government is widely distributed 
among a great number of individuals with different 
conceptions as to what is morally required in 
international affairs, or with no such conceptions 
at all, international morality as an effective 
system of restraints.upon international policy 
becomes impossible." ■ 
Morgenthau's views conflict when domestic polity and
 
international relations merge. If, aS he states, domestic
 
morality is to be prized, what happens when popular support
 
wanes with respect to official international policy? Rather
 
than acquiesce to Populist pressure, Morgenthau states:
 
Whenever these two sets of conditions diverge,
 
those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy
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are confronted with a tragic choice. Either they
 
must sacrifice what they consider good policy on
 
the alter of public opinion, or they must by devious
 
means, gain popular support for policies ^ gose
 
tru© natur© is conc©al©d from th© public.
 
George Kennan supports Morgenthau's views of morality.
 
He too believes that moral principles have a place in
 
shaping individual conduct both as a citizen and as a
 
government official. However he believes that when
 
individual moral philosophy merges with millions of other
 
individual philosophies it is transformed and the original
 
precepts are no longer valid. Thus governments are not
 
the creator of morals but only an agent for the collective
 
morality; "and ho more than any other agent may it attempt
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to be the conscience of its principle.
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CHAPTER FOUR
 
TRANSNATIONALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE
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Increasingly the world's maps are showing antiquated
 
borders. People, ideas, commodities and social mores flow
 
across state lines. Interstate problems that were once
 
solved by the diplomat and the soldier are now finding
 
other actors such as individuals, multinational
 
corporations, non-governmental organizations and even
 
intergovernmental organizations imposing their demands
 
on the international system. Thus, both problems and
 
solutions are moving beyond the purview of the state.
 
Transnationalism is challenging the long established.
 
Realist inspired. State eentric model which contends that
 
the state is a hardshelled unit with international relations
 
occurring outside of the unit. Because Transnationalism
 
has more elements than Realism, this chapter will provide
 
more additional information in greater depth than the
 
previous chapter for two reasons. First, Transnationalism
 
seeking to displace the existing model; and second, the
 
theory is broader in scope and more complex. This section
 
is divided into several subsections. The first seeks to
 
define transnationalism as variations of a theme and offers
 
various definitions which seek to clarify and resolve the
 
ambiguities associated with the new paradigm. The second
 
section examines the growing interdependence of politics
 
and economics. In the third section inquiry will focus
 
on the impact of technology in international relations
 
through a discussion of the product cycle and the
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appropriations theory. Fourth, an analysis of the emergence
 
of the Multinational Corporation as an international actor
 
will be presented. The fifth section illuminates the growth
 
of international organizations and their impact on
 
international relations, finally, this section will provide
 
a synopsis of the major debates between the scholars so
 
that the reader can more easily discern the entire paradigm.
 
Defining Transnationalism
 
According to Seymond Brown "the alignments and
 
antagonisms of the recent past are shifting ground and
 
structures premised on their stability appear to be
 
crumbing."1 The realignment reflects a dissolution of the
 
cold war balance of power and a renewed focus toward other
 
structures such as "ethnicity, religion, social class,
 
economic function, and generation with each vying for a
 
large piece of pie." This movement away from the state
 
having sole control over international relations was first
 
identified as Political Linkage and then due to misusage
 
of the term, has become known as Transnationalism (see
 
figure 4.1).
 
Unlike the State Gentric theorists, Transnationalism
 
demands that theorists separate themselves from their
 
respective national interests and social mores that could
 
color their perception of international relations. As a
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Figure 4.1
 
Interrelationships
 
Actor /I Aclor D
 
Actor C
 
Obstacles to theory building require a radical revision
 
of the standard conception of (state) politics that
 
posits a world of national and international actors
 
whose interrelationships loolc like this.
 
(Transnational Theory) requires supplementing the
 
conventional conception with one that looks like (the

following incorporating multiple linkages between
 
states and non state actors).
 
Aclor A
 ActorD
 
ActorC
 
or even this:
 
From: James N, Rosenau, ed., J.inkage Politics, (New York;
 
Free Press, 1969), p. 45.
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result Transnationalists see national borders as too limited
 
a criterion for illuminating all of the activities that
 
occur in the international arena. The perception that
 
government's role has diminished as the primary actor varies
 
from scholar to scholar. But in general theorists agree
 
that Transnationalism is "the processes whereby
 
international relations conducted by governments have been
 
supplemented by relations among private individuals, groupsf
 
and societies that can and do have important consequences
 
for the course of events"^ These Transnational interactions
 
are not new and do not supersede interstate politics "but
 
they affect interstate politics by altering the choices
 
open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for
 
adopting various courses of action." (see figure 4.2).
 
Transnational interactions can be further refined by
 
process. In concert with the basic premises of this study
 
is the notion that output takes precedence over input,
 
all of which James Rosenau identifies as recurring sequences
 
of behavior. That is, that linkage as a basic unit of
 
analysis, can be operationalized through the application
 
of "initial" and "terminal" stages which, Rosenau no doubt
 
drawing on the work of David Easton, labels respectively
 
as outputs and inputs. These stages are in turn classified
 
as taking place within a polity or its external environment.
 
Citing Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) Rosenau is quick
 
to point out that:
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Figure 4.2
 
Nve and Keohane's Interaction Patterns
 
A STATE-CENTRIC INTERACTION
 
PATTERN
 
]
 
I
 
f
 
I
 
I
 
f
 
1
 
f
 
\
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
4
I
 
Sz
Si
 
Interstate politics
 
Domestic politics
 
G = Government
 
S = Society
 
IGO = Intergovernmental organization
 
TRANSNATIONAL INTERACTIONS AND INTERSTATE POLITICS
 
IGO
 
/ \
 
/ \
 
\
 
A'
 
/
 
\
 
\
 
/
 \i
u:
 
Classic interstate politics
 
Domestic politics
 
. ._Transnational interactions
 
G = Government
 
S = Society . ^ . x. ^
 
IGO = Intergovernmental interactions and interstate politics
 
From Joseph S. Nye and Robert 0. Keohane. "Transnational
 
Relations and World Politics: An Introduction.
 
International Organization, Vol 25 Number 3 Summer
 
71
 
Although the term 'environment' has special meanings
 
for students of international politics/ in this
 
discussion it is employed in the more general,
 
systems theory sense with which students of
 
comparative politics are familiar. It is conceived
 
as an analytic entity consisting of all the human
 
and nonhuman phenomena that exist external to a
 
polity, irrespective of whether their existence
 
is perceived by the actors of the polity.
 
Accordingly "environmental inputs" are those social
 
expressions that occur in the external environment that
 
gave rise to the policy outputs. Concomitantly,
 
"environmental outputs" are those behaviors that begin
 
in the external environments of a polity and are either
 
supported or terminated within a polity. Finally, "polity
 
inputs" are those social expressions occurring within a
 
polity that are the result of environmental outputs. This
 
input-output method of conflict resolution was the first
 
model used by Transnationalists to describe the emergence
 
of the theory from a closed hard shelled system. The
 
political theory has changed to the point that the first
 
portion of his pseudo-Eastohian model is not as valid as
 
the second portion of Rosenau's discussion. Aside
 
from his Eastonian premise Rosenau claims there are three
 
types of interactions or linkage ptocess. First, "the
 
penetrative process occurs when members of one polity serve
 
as participants in the political process of another."
 
Such participants include, for example, armies,
 
corporations, terrorists, international organizations,
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foreign aid missions, like the Peace Corps or Cuban
 
teachers, and transnational political parties such as the
 
Christian Social Democrats. Rosenau saw these links as
 
direct. In contrast, the"reactive process...is brought
 
into being by recurrent and similar boundary- crossing
 
reactions rather than by the sharing of authority." in
 
the reactive process the actor's initial output is in
 
response to some form of direct or indirect stimuli from
 
another entity. Rosenau is led to conclude that this process
 
is the most common form of international linkage. Finally,
 
the emulative process "is established when the input is
 
not only a response to the output but takes essentially
 
the same form as the output."10 Modernization is an example
 
of this emulative process and while it can be closely tied
 
to the penetrative process it has a spillover effect and
 
is not the result of direct actions or policies imposed
 
upon another state.
 
Nye and Keohane offer a much simpler explanation of
 
transnational interaction. They see transnational
 
interactions as "...the movement of tangible or intangible
 
items across state boundaries when at least one actor is
 
not an agent of a government or an international
 
organization."11 Thus, they contend there are four types
 
of global interactions; (1) communication which is occurring
 
at increased rates and provides for rapid dispersal of
 
"beliefs, ideas and doctrines"; (2) increased modes of
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transportation which allow for "the movement of physical
 
objects, including war materiel and personal property as
 
well as merchandise"; (3) international finance; and (4)
 
19
 
travel. ^
 
■According to Nye and Keohane, transnational 
interactions have, and continue to, produce at least five 
results: (1) attitude changes, (2) international pluralism, 
(3) increased constraints on,states through dependence 
and interdependence, (4) increases in the ability of certain 
governments to influence others, and (5) the emergence 
of autonomous actors with private foreign policies that 
13 
may deliberately oppose or impinge on state polices." 
Walter Jones offers yet another perspective of 
Transnationalism by postulating that: 
(The) contact between two or more nongovernmental 
actors, or between one official actor and one or 
more private actors. The nongovernmental participants 
may be corporations interest groups, political
parties, elite structures or formally instituted 
organizations designed to facilitate private
relations. An agreement between an oil company and 
a foreign government falls in this category, as 
does contact between the International Red Cross 
and the government of Cuba^ An International Youth
Conference involving no governments, is also 
transnational. 
Jones* definition is one of the most comprehensive yet 
it too contains an oversight. It does not fully encompus 
all relevent actors who have influence apart from their 
institutional positions as non-governmental actors for 
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 example, Albert Schweitzer, Mother Theresa and Andrei
 
Sakharov. However, even with its faults it is the most
 
comprehensive explanation.
 
The Growing Interdependence of Economics and Politics
 
The key issue and pivotal to the theory of
 
transnationalism, is the rate at which international
 
interdependence takes place. According to Transnationalists
 
increases in the level of interdependence buttress the
 
validity of the theory. However one of the problems facing
 
theorists is defining just exactly what interdependence
 
is. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein in their article,
 
"Interdependence: Myth and Reality" attempt to define the
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term and show a high degree of interdependence between 
states exists. They believe that interdependence can be 
defined as: (1 ) relationships between states that are linked 
so that if one nation's interests change others will be 
affected; (2) interdependence can be a function of economics 
sensitizing states to changes within that sphere; and/or 
(3), using Kenneth Waltz's definition, it would be a 
"relationship that would be costly to break."15 Rosecrance 
and Stein believe that Waltz's definition deviates 
significantly from the other two in that there is the 
presumption of a positive relationship between states. 
David Singer also identifies several stibsystems that 
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promote interdependence. He claims there are several
 
"Intra-National Entities" like families, tribes and
 
employers that act to either defuse or legitimate ideas
 
and promote social norms. Equally as important in the
 
political socialization process are governments and non
 
governmental entities such as "trade unions,
 
industrial-commercial associations, banking and investment
 
institutions, professional societies, vocational groups,
 
ethnic, ideological, and religious organizations, separatist
 
movements, and finally, political parties."^® Second, Singer
 
believes that foreign policy is effected by "Extra- National
 
Entities". These entities cross over national borders either
 
physically or ideologically. A result of this cross linkage
 
is that many groups fuse with their counter parts in other
 
countries and ask them to exert some form of pressure on
 
their respective governments. Third, Singer sees "National
 
States" acting as mediators between those individuals
 
working at home and those citizens traveling abroad. Fourth,
 
he assumes that historically most "Inter-Nation Coalitions"
 
are historically recognized as military alliances but more
 
recently other inter- governmental organizations (IGO's)
 
such as the Arab League, NATO, OAS, Comintern, and The
 
Organization of African Unity, have begun to grow in
 
strength and place new and often greater demands on the
 
international community than previous military alliances.
 
Finally, Singer believes that there are "National
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Environments", or geopolitical conditions, which act to
 
link nations together. These environments include not only
 
contiguous borders but also regional and shared geographic
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attributes like oceanic frontage, deserts or forests.
 
While David Singer correctly identifies many of the
 
elements that impact the international system he does not
 
address the linkages fostered by technology.
 
Technology
 
Technology has moved the global community toward a
 
greater interdependence and has been the underlying cause
 
of many of the recent revolutions particularly in Iran,
 
but also perhaps in Eastern Europe and China.
 
Robert Gilpin claims that the effect of modern
 
technology on the international relations scene has marked
 
one of the major schisms between the Transnationalists
 
and the Realists. On one hand the Transnationalists believe
 
that advancements in weaponry have changed the consequences
 
and as such, the nature of warfare. This shift, they
 
contend, is evident in the doctrine of mutual assured
 
destruction (MAD) that opts for suicide over victory.
 
Therefore military power has become of little use and is
 
no longer a rational option to conflict resolution. Thus,
 
strategies of power have been forced to change. Even Hans
 
Morgenthau concedes: "I think a revolution has occurred
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...through the introduction of nuclear weapons into the
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arsenal of warfare."
 
On the other hand, the realists contend that their
 
theory, which hinges on the distribution of power, has
 
not been damaged because, although incidents of war have
 
declined, the threat to wage war has increased and enhanced
 
the position of the main actors.
 
Aside from the debate over technology and warfare,
 
Transnationalists believe that no nation can maintain a
 
monopoly in the area of research and development,
 
particularly as it is applied to the Multi^National
 
Corporation (MNC). Raymond Vernon agrees and argues for
 
this assumption in his theory of the Product Cycle.
 
Economic theorists, Raymond Vernon, William Gruber
 
and Dileep Mehta, have concluded a study in which they
 
contend, U.S. technology and related products pass through
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four phases in what they deem to be a product cycle.
 
These theorists claim the cycle begins when managers respond
 
to a deficiency in the domestic market which they then
 
attempt to fill with a suitable product. Thus, MNC's begin
 
product development with the anticipation of selling at
 
home rather than abroad. During this initial phase firms
 
produce and innovate products at home for several reasons;
 
(1) the company has a ready supply of engineers, scientists
 
and technicians available to develop the product; (2) these
 
technocrats can interact with prospective buyers to work
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out any of the early bugs in the product; and (3) firms
 
like economic and social stability when they are introducing
 
or creating new products. This penchant for socioeconomic
 
stability is related to the firm's desire to be able to
 
anticipate swings in the domestic market and to be free
 
from excessive political interferencef allowing them to
 
produce without the fear of being banned or nationalized.
 
So, in phase one, product development becomes linked to
 
stable externalities and a compatible geographic proximity
 
for both the client and the manufacturer to perfect the
 
product.
 
The second phase is characterized by the
 
standardization of the product which leads to easier
 
production and utilization of previously existing parts.
 
According to Vernon, standardization causes the product
 
to be produced more efficiently and, as a result, prices
 
fall as the firm seeks a larger market. Due to the decline
 
in price the company monopoly becomes opened up to increased
 
threats by rival producers pursuing similar products while
 
using cheaper foreign labor.
 
In the third phase, the firm anticipating the loss
 
of its monopoly begins to shift its production from the
 
high-paid labor (and resources) found at home to cheaper
 
sources found abroad. However, firms still tend to act
 
on the threat more slowly than rivals appropriate their
 
technology. Vernon assumes, that even though firms know
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rivals are intent on taking a portion of the existing
 
foreign market, firms act slowly because they often do
 
not perceive the threat until after the rival has already
 
begun to produce. In,addition, the innovator finally gets
 
the impetus to move pnly after it has suffered a reduction
 
in its foreign market.20 Thus, in an attempt to hold on
 
to, or regain its original monopolistic advantage, the
 
firm sets up foreign production. As an indirect result,
 
the change in location of production effectively carries
 
the transfer of technology from the more developed nations
 
to the lesser developed countries (LDCVs). This transfer
 
is completed by either the establishment of foreign
 
subsidiaries or by licensing a foreign-held company to
 
produce in return for royalties.
 
Finally, foreign production outstrips indigenous
 
production leaving the developed nation a net importer
 
of its own technology. Therefore, according to Vernon,
 
the only way we, as a developed nation, can maintain our
 
comparative advantage is not in the production of the
 
product but in the continuing innovation of new
 
technology.21

Steven Margee builds upon Vernon's product cycle by
 
focusing on the length of the innovative and maturation
 
phases. In concert w,ith Vernon, and key to Magee's
 
appropriations theory, is his belief that as long as
 
innovating firms continue to maintain their technological
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lead over appropriators (copiers or thieves) they will
 
remain youthful and economically viable. But as firms expand
 
their operations, "emulators in the United States and abroad
 
reduce the profitability of innovations so that the
 
industry's product line shifts to older, more standardized
 
products".22 Sadly, any turn toward standardization is
 
not conducive to the long term well-being of the U.S.
 
economy since the labor market dictates high wages. Thus,
 
standardized American industries tend to become moribund
 
and ask for government protection from foreign
 
competition.^^
 
In contrast to Vernon*s product cycle, Magee contends
 
that the flow of technology is best examined within the
 
context of the industry technology cycle. He believes that
 
the primary problem facing MNC's is the rivalry between
 
appropriators and innovators. This rivalry is spurred on
 
by the high cost of technology and the appropriators* desire
 
to steal technology, or at minimum, copy the product to
 
cut those costs. As a result, MNC's jealously guard their
 
trade secrets shifting their scientific knowledge in-house
 
between subsidiaries rather than produce the product, via
 
contract, on the open market.
 
Magee states that, some innovations are so widely
 
used they become publicly owned (i.e., the zipper) and
 
the return to the innovator falls. He calls this the
 
"appropriations problem." In an attempt to hedge against
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 appropriations MNC's produce more complex technologies
 
because "sophisticated ideas are hard to copy."^^ Thus,
 
the "problem" requires firms to continue to pursue
 
additional research and development to stay alive.
 
Multi-National Corporate Growth
 
Even the most conservative of conteraporary scholars
 
should recognize that multi national corporations are key
 
players in every nation and in one way or another effect
 
every person on the planet.
 
Raymond Vernon defines the multinational corporation
 
as "a cluster of corporations of different nationalities
 
that are joined together by a parent company through bonds
 
of common ownership, that respond to a common strategy,
 
and that draw on a common pool of finances and human
 
resources." He claims that the boundaries between states
 
are being lessened due to the influx of goods manufactured
 
abroad. No longer is it unusual to have goods that are
 
manufactured in different nations that are internationally
 
standardized.
 
Harry Magdoff contends, that business itself is
 
pursuing global cohesion as a method of increasing profits
 
and claims that "the advanced thinkers and publicists of
 
the business community have sounded the tocsin; the old
 
. . , 

fashioned natiohstate is standing in the way of progress"
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However, he hastens to point out, that while multinational
 
corporations may represent integrated global production
 
they should not be thought of as efficient producers except
 
in the realm of exploitation of world resources. As
 
resources dwindle in one nation they began to shift to
 
cheap resources in found in another state. Accordingly
 
we must see MNCs as self serving and not as some benevolent
 
entity. A prime example of Magdoff's warning can be seen
 
in food production.
 
According to Francis Moore Lappe, increases in food
 
production have outstripped the increases in population
 
growth rate in every area of world except the African Sahel
 
since 1950. She claims that, "abundance, not scarcity,
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best describes the supply of food in the world today."
 
The question then arises as to why there are starving people
 
in under developed countries. The answer is that, the
 
foodstuffs that are grown in those regions are either
 
exported by agribusiness to the developed world or are
 
disposed of in an inefficient manner, such as food for
 
livestock. As a result, many states are faced with importing
 
finished products, mono crop agriculture and a populace
 
that does not have the economic wherewithal to place food
 
on their tables.
 
Agribusiness is defined as anything used to produce
 
food from the seed to the refrigerator into which the
 
customer sticks their hand to pull out a product. In many
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respects agribusiness shares common business traits: (1)
 
It is market-oriented; (2) The demand is stable and
 
inelastic; (3) Profit margins are low; (4) Income and profit
 
are slow but constant; and (5) Cash flows are large.
 
But agribusiness also has the uncommon trait of being
 
oligopic. That is, several large firms control most of
 
the output. They are characterized by their mutually
 
interdependent behavior, each considering their actions
 
on the others prior to changing policy.
 
Agribusiness is often asked to come into a developing
 
nation and advise its government on the best way to produce
 
a product. The reason UDC's ask agribusiness or MNC's to
 
come into their economies is, in part, because of their
 
need for foreign exchange. In turn, MNC's are attracted
 
to developing countries because of high profit rates, which
 
result from some combination of cheap labor, tax benefits,
 
new markets, and relaxed economic and environmental
 
regulations. In addition, MNC's benefit from other
 
developmental factors, such as access to foreign investment
 
capital; most importantly, they control most of the research
 
and development that is being applied to the UDC's new
 
agricultural product. Lastly, MNC's decide the marketing
 
strategies for the products. The advantage to agribusiness
 
firms is that controlling these developmental factors are
 
that as the they grow more powerful, they remove the
 
decision making processes away from the source of the
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products to their home base in a developed nation. The
 
centralizing of power occurs because UDC's cannot produce
 
technocrats which are needed for efficient indigenous
 
corporate operation, but more often because corporations
 
seek to increase profits and hide taxes due the state.
 
Finally, Third World elites conspire with the MNC management
 
because of a lack of loyalty to the state and people for
 
which they have a responsibility.
 
Growth of international Organizations
 
Transnationalists believe that world politics is
 
becoming increasingly more integrated. Scholars such as
 
Keohane, Nye and Rosenau claim, that separate national
 
entities which have political and/or economic power are
 
merging into supranational authorities. Although this
 
process is slow, multi layered, and tends to grow in spurts,
 
most scholars contend that the merging of economies is
 
usually the first step toward greater interdependence.
 
This is now transpiring in Europe under the European
 
Community.
 
Most theorists believe that increases in integration
 
are based on previously successful ventures. Therefore,
 
integration or progress on one front becomes linked to
 
progress in other sectors. However, not "even compatible
 
societies cannot integrate all public functions
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simultaneously." Thus, federation can only take place
 
when several sectors become linked so that they produce
 
carry over effects. Walter Jones identifies the economic
 
sector as the primary sector, exemplified by various groups
 
like the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Latin
 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), organizations
 
which act to tie the economies of sovereign states together.
 
The second area that states integrate is the social
 
structure. This is much more difficult to achieve than
 
meshing economies since it involves changing individual
 
loyalties from village devotion to regional and then support
 
to nationalism and ultimately to a larger and more removed
 
political entity. The third area Jones addresses is
 
political. This area is even more difficult to promote
 
assimilation than the other two sectors because it demands
 
that nations yield a portion of their sovereignty to either
 
a regional system such as the European Community or an
 
international system, which to date is the U.N. The final
 
sector of integration is collective security. According
 
to Jones integrations of this type are rare and involves
 
more than building alliances, in which the dominate power
 
makes the decisions for the weaker nations. It implies
 
that politics and militaries of states become linked through
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some time of crises. However it remains to be seen whether
 
integration carries with it equality of decision making.
 
. ! . . . . . ■ 
Questioning Jones, it seems that nations are more eager 
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to join military forces in an effort to provide collective
 
security than for any other single reason of integration.
 
International Organization and Functionalism
 
Keohane and Nye point out that Transnational
 
organizations impact interstate politics by effectively
 
producing
 
(1) attitude changes, (2) international pluralism,
 
(3) increased in constraints on states through
 
dependence and interdependence, (4) increases in
 
the ability of certain governments to influence
 
others, and (5) the emergence of autonomous actors
 
with private foreign policies that may deliberately
 
oppose or impinge on states policies.
 
Transnational organizations play a major role in promoting
 
world pluralism by linking national groups with their
 
counter parts in other nations. These transnational
 
organizations take two forms, international
 
intergovernmental organizations (IGGs) and non governmental
 
international organizations (NGOs), both of which emanate
 
from a parent organization or state which allocates
 
resources, There has been a noticeable increase in the
 
chartering of IGO's as well as vast growth in NGO's in
 
recent years and particularly since the 1940's (see figure
 
4.3). As a result of this growth, exchanges within the
 
international system have established new avenues by which
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Figure 4.3
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governments and organizations are able to exert influence
 
over outside governments.
 
According to Wallace and Singer the criteria for
 
an IGO is (1) the organization must have at least two
 
qualified members; (2) there must be a permanent secretariat
 
and a permanent headquarters; and (3) date that mark the
 
birth or death of each organization. The growth in IGO's
 
is due to many factors; one of them is that nations on
 
low budgets are increasingly drawn to use international
 
organizations as their chief method of diplomacy.34 Another
 
factor is that additional exchanges between states create
 
avenues by which governments are able to exert influence
 
over other governments. Still another factor is the
 
professional cohesion which bonds bureaucratic members
 
of one state to another through international
 
organizations.
 
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
 
defines a NonGovernmental Organization as "any international
 
organization which is not established by intergovernmental
 
agreement..." NGO's vary greatly from charities to
 
political organizations but all share a common thread—
 
they are able to exert influence on the state. This element
 
of power draws additional members to the organizations.
 
Thus, non government actors control more resources than
 
*5 C\
 
in previous years and "exist by integrating the
 
governments of nation-states or citizens of many states
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into a common organization."37 Concomitantly, within the
 
borders of states NGO's also influence the growth of
 
autonomous actors that form policies that are in opposition
 
38
 to the official policy. Examples include the spread of
 
communism in the 1920s and 1960s, fascism and Nazism during
 
the 1930s and 40s, and the more recent spread of the Islamic
 
revolution.
 
The study of internatidnal intergovernmental
 
integration has fallen to a subfield of Transnationalism
 
known as functionalism or neofunctionalism (see figure
 
4.4). By definition, "functionalism is a theory which
 
describes a gradual progression from confrontational forms
 
of international cooperation to supranationalism." This
 
is done by fostering a process which reduces the differences
 
in political systems and by gradually increasing mutually
 
shared interests.39 Functionalists argue both that
 
international cohesion will continue to increase as
 
economies become further integrated and that cooperation
 
in economic integration produces working relationships
 
between states which effectively bypass politics. However,
 
David Mitrany, "father" of functionalism, cautions that
 
economic parliaments that have been tried in the past failed
 
miserably and given today's climate it is even more
 
difficult to separate economies from social issues and
 
politics. Moreover, there is a penchant to expand
 
governmental institutions beyond their functional design
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Figure 4.4
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and as such, policies and information becomes too mixed
 
to have validity. Paramount among his concerns is that
 
all of the past economic parliaments were dominated by
 
special interests. Instead of this political milieu, Mitrany
 
contends that international economics should fall under
 
40

the direction of nongovernmental organizations. But
 
clearly, functionalists contend, working relationships
 
aid in the transference of loyalty from individual states
 
to a supranational organization which ultimately form into
 
a global community.41
 
Neofunctionalists differ from functionalists in that,
 
while they agree economics has a major role to play, they
 
do not believe that social transformation will automatically
 
follow economics. Instead they contend that politics tends
 
to twist or push the integration process through "cultivated
 
spillover. In this process energy from previous
 
successful ventures carries or spills over into another
 
sector and furthers integration between nation states.
 
Schisms Between The Theorists
 
There are two areas in which Transnational Theorists
 
are divided (see figure 4.5). The first debate centers
 
on benefits produced from international integration.
 
Surprisingly there are those within the field that believe
 
that international integration may produce more ills than
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Pessimist and Optimist arguments cross over the schism
 
between opposing schools of thought. Optimism is higher
 
on the World Orderist side due to their commitment
 
of fostering world government. Pessimism is^higher
 
among the Globalists because they believe there is
 
an increased chance of anarchy due to changes within
 
international relations.
 
Diagrammed by Dr. Maghroori during an interview on
 
June 24, 1989,
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it will cure. This debate was termed by Ray Maghroori as
 
the optimist and pessimist conflict.'^^ The second debate
 
is on whether or hot Transnationalists should take an active
 
role leading mankind toward increased integration with
 
the ultimate aim being world government or, as others in
 
the field contend, merely report on the phenomena as
 
scientists. These two groups are respectively known as
 
World Orderists and the Transnationalist Globalists. Each
 
of these debates will be discussed below.
 
Optimists and Pessimists
 
The optimistic Transnationalists see the inter-twining
 
of political a;nd socio-ecohomic systems as a ray of bright
 
hope. They contend that integration of systems will
 
ultimately produce a world community and a world culture,
 
which in turn will give rise to a world state or
 
government.^^
 
On the other hand, pessimistic Karl Kaiser claims,
 
"transnational relations and other multinational process
 
seriously threaten democratic control of foreign policy,
 
particularly in advanced industrial societies. Kaiser
 
contends that, due to transnationalism, domestic issues
 
have become embroiled with decisions that have been made
 
from outside the state and result in a loss of democratic
 
participation by those who reside within that state. He
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believes that the primary legitimacy for foreign policy
 
rests with those consenting to be governed. However,
 
increased intergovernmental participation might sway
 
constituents toward democratic solutions that may not be
 
in their best interest. He further claims, that the
 
influence of integration on the democratic process has
 
reduced the power of the Executive branch to enforce
 
regulations. This weakens the state's negotiating advantage
 
and moves any settlement into the sphere of competing
 
national interests. Thus, he concludes, increased
 
integration threatens the democratic process.
 
Transnationalist Globalists and World Orderists
 
Here again the field is split between two camps; the
 
system maintance proponents who claim that gradualism is
 
the best path to take as political scientists because it
 
will not upset stability, and the System- Transformers
 
who are seeking to push the system into reform before
 
civilization collapses.46 These two schools have become
 
known as the Trahsnationalist Globalist and the World
 
Orderists.
 
The Globalists unlike the Orderists "do not presume
 
to have discovered the dynamiGS of the underlying order,
 
in as much as uniform as those set by national interests
 
or the requirements of capitalism,"^^ They believe that
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slow integration of the functional elements between polities
 
will actually provide a more stable and less conflicting
 
world community than a pro-active approach that tends to
 
increase the probability of an anarchical world.
 
Whereas the Globalists see the withering of the nation-

state as a matter of fact, the World Orderists assert the
 
"state system inclines the world toward destruction."48
 
They believe the state system must either be destroyed
 
as quickly as possible and some other form of Utopian system
 
be instituted in its place. They see themselves in a
 
pro-active role believing that it is their mission to show
 
the paths whereby the global village can achieve transition
 
to a higher human plain.
 
According to Richard Falk, the academic field of World
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Order is primarily a North American invention. In the
 
early stages the field was criticized as plagued with
 
advocacy rather than analysis. This reasoning was countered
 
by proponents who argued that the purpose of a higher
 
education included the placement of values. Falk argues
 
that, "They concluded that anyone who insisted that
 
objectivity excluded normative considerations endorsed,
 
wittingly, or not, the status quo. In other words, an
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academic inquiry could never be a neutral one".
 
The second criticism about Orderists is their
 
preoccupation with establishing a world government as a
 
means toward greater international co-operation and hence
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international security. Critics claim that the
 
unattainability of this goal makes the studies of this
 
field a waste of time.
 
The third criticism facing Orderists is their penchant
 
for cultural integration. Opponents argue that because
 
mores differ between cultures the promotion of Orderists'
 
ideology is a waste of time and that they should concentrate
 
on a more important factor--that human nature has common
 
traits that motivate human behavior. Falk believes that
 
there has been no accounting of human nature. Accordingly,
 
this has led to unsuccessful attempts by the
 
Transnationalists in general and the Orderists in particular
 
"to proceed from here to there. Or to employ more recent
 
terminology, in its attempt to solve the "transition
 
problem'."^2
 
Many different variables impact on the process of
 
transnational integration. Often there are quite a few
 
obstacles in the way for integration to occur and at other
 
times integration transpires with no problems at all.
 
Therefore when considering the variables before enacting
 
a policy or when studying the results of a policy we must
 
take into account the environment in which the integration
 
or proposed integration occurred.
 
Rosenau recognizes many different categories within
 
this environment. These include: (1> "The Contiguous
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Environment" such as "boundary disputes, historic rivalries,
 
traditional friendships and the many other distinctive
 
c:*5
 
features of relations among immediate neighbors." ; (2)
 
"the Regional Environment," such as Central America, South
 
America and North America as opposed to Europe; (3) "the
 
Cold War Environment"; (4) "the Racial Environment" which
 
manifests itself in the strife between ethnic groups; (5)
 
"the Resource Environment," defined as "the activities
 
through which goods and services in the external world
 
of any polity are created, processed, and utilized," rather
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than the existence of the resources themselves ; and
 
(6) "the Grganizational Environment," such as the growth
 
of the United Nations and the International Court of
 
Justice.
 
The main challenges to Rosenau's theory of environments
 
can be traced to the wOrks of Lucien Pye (1965) and Gabriel
 
Almond and Sidney Verba (1963). The central thrust of their
 
thesis is that, every political system has a psychological
 
orientation toward a "political system and its various
 
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the
 
system". According to Almond and Verba these psychological
 
orientations can be effectively translated into three types
 
of political orientations:
 
(1) "cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge
 
of a political system, its roles and the incumbents
 
of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs;
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(2) "affective orientation," or feelings about
 
the political system, its roles, personnel, and
 
performance, and
 
(3) "evaluational orientation," the judgments and
 
opinions about political objects that typically
 
involve the combination of value standards and
 
criteria with information and feeling.
 
Thus, the political culture of a particular society
 
can be defined as the "particular distribution of patterns
 
of cognitive, affective, and evaluational orientations
 
among the population toward political objects".R7 The
 
frequency in which these elements are combined results
 
in three political cultures: the parochial, the subject
 
and the participant. The first culture lacks specialized
 
political roles and as a result individuals feel that the
 
political system will not respond to their needs. In the
 
second culture, indiviuals recognize that they are affected
 
by the output of the system but are removed from the input
 
process. Third, the participant political culture is one
 
in which individuals enjoy all of the aspects of the
 
political system even though they may be disillusioned
 
from time to time.
 
Almond and Verba further assert that political cultures
 
become diffused and that they simply do not replace one
 
another, but become combined with "earlier"orientations.
 
Therefore, "every political culture is a 'mix,' and the
 
classification of parochial, subject, and participant
 
cultures does not suggest homogeneity or uniformity, but
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the statistical frequency of particular orientations.
 
As such participant cultures include some parochials and
 
subjects. This mix often impedes the development of the
 
state and ultimately lends to state instability.
 
However a fundimental weakness in Almond and Verba's
 
approach is that it appears to be insensitive to cultural
 
variations between and within states. Nor does political
 
culture "resolve the fundamental problem of relationship
 
between the political culture and the political system.
 
While political culture may explain incremental change
 
within the state it lacks an explanation for revolutionary
 
change. Moreover as James Bill and Robert Hardgrave suggest,
 
"its focus is almost wholly on the 'input' side of the
 
political system^— on the determinants of political behavior
 
rather than on political behavior as such,"^®
 
CONCLUSION
 
This paper has traced the origins of colonialism and
 
demonstrated its legacy which continues to impact current
 
state relationships. As mentioned, the author finds no
 
significant differences between the terms colonialism and
 
imperialism. Colonialism implies the domination of one
 
society over another for the purposes of territorial and
 
economic gain. As a corollary, imperialism can be described
 
as the tools used by colonialists to implement their
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objectives. Although, some scholars may wish to argue that
 
neo-imperialism is separate and distinct frOm colonialism,
 
I contend, that for the most part, the precepts of
 
colonialism still continue to operate within this system.
 
The ideological expressions of colonialism were
 
rationalized and operationalized in Realism. Realists
 
concern themselves with the distribution of power. They
 
argue that national interest is national power and
 
conversely, national power is buttressed by acquisition
 
of interests. Accordingly, Realists argue that men are
 
motivated by self interests which continually change and
 
are reflected in state foreign policy. Goncomitantly,
 
politics is divided into domestic and interna.tional spheres
 
each separate and distinct from the other, both in terms
 
of morals and economics. Thus, realists hold any affirmation
 
of universal morality and its relationship to international
 
relations as spurious. In fact, the only "good" policy
 
is one which insures the survivability of the state.
 
I have offered an alternative view to Realist paradigm.
 
Transnationalism is not a radical departure, but rather,
 
a continuation of theory based on world interdependence.
 
As discussed, Transnationalism contends, that the world
 
is more complex than states being driven by the need for
 
national security. Besides the military, diplomats and
 
official policy makers, other non-state actors also
 
influence the internatiohal polity. Transnationalists argue
 
>,.101 ■. 
tliat international relations are becoming'increasingly
 
more integrated and that political and economic powers
 
are merging into supranationational entities. Although
 
this process is slow, multilayered, and grows by spurts
 
it is continual.
 
Finally, Transnationalism is a viable alternative
 
because it is flexible, culture sensitive, combines politics
 
and economics, and accurately depicts the contemporary
 
political setting.
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